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Homelessness is a great tragedy. AIDS is another. No words are
sufficient to describe the plight of those facing both a1fictions ... 
I. INTRODUCTION
Many citizens believe that every person has a right to food, cloth-
ing, shelter, and freedom from disease.2 Although not widely adopted
as a legal measure,3 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,4
issued by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, represents
an "ideal goal" with respect to human rights.5 It states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well being of himself and of his family, including food,
1. Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/88, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989) (order
granting preliminary injunction), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 157 A.D.2d 423, 556
N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1990).
2. For example, the members of the Institute of Medicine's Committee on Health Care
for Homeless People "support the principle that decent housing is every American's right."
Vladek, A National Scandal, IssuES SC. & TECH., Fall 1988, at 86.
3. Banks, AIDS and the Right to Health Care, 4 ISSUES L. & MED. 151, 159 (1988).
4. Art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/810, U.N. Sales No. 1952.1.15 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration of Human Rights], reprinted in Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Addressing
Bureaucratic Disentitlement, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 591, 591 (1988).
5. Banks, supra note 3, at 159.
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clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in cir-
cumstances beyond his control.6
Similarly, the Housing Act of 1949" expresses the goal that every
family should have a "decent home and suitable living environment."'
Vigorous legal and social debate over the provision of basic necessities
to indigents, however, tends to undermine these noble aspirations.9 In
many jurisdictions, courts and legislatures are still wrestling over
whether all people have a right to the basic necessities of life, regard-
less of their ability to pay.10 In jurisdictions that have recognized
such a right, controversy surrounds the selection of appropriate gov-
ernmental entities to provide particular services and ensure enforce-
ment of these entitlements." As the deinstitutionalization of the
1950's through 1980's aptly demonstrates, the federal government
believes that housing and medical care are essentially a local concern,
while local governments are neither adequately funded nor prepared
to accomplish the task. Finally, the scope of governmental services to
be provided remains an unresolved issue.1 2 For example, once a gov-
ernmental entity acts to provide medical services, does it also have a
duty to ensure adequate shelter so that the recipient of the medical
attention will have an appropriate environment in which to recover?
While governmental entities debate over whether there is a duty
to provide for basic necessities, and whose responsibility it is, a new
crisis is emerging stemming from a rapidly increasing number of indi-
viduals who lack both adequate medical care and shelter. Although
many of the arguments incorporated in this Comment may apply to
various medically needy populations, this Comment focuses on HIV-
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4.
7. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and
42 U.S.C.).
8. Id. § 2.
9. See, e.g., Lehmann, Access to Care, QUALITY REV. BULL., Feb. 1988, at 55; Reidinger,
Paying for AIDS: Government's Role Grows, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 94; Ruffenach, Debate
Grows over Rationing Medical Care, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, at BI, col. 6.
10. E.g., Joanne S. v. Carey, 115 A.D.2d 4, 5, 498 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (App. Div. 1986)
("There has been a bitter battle ... throughout America as to whether State or local
governments, or private resources, alone, should bear the responsibility for sheltering the
homeless.").
11. The issue of which governmental entities should implement and enforce established
duties is beyond the scope of this Comment.
12. See infra notes 185-223 & 314-23 and accompanying text.
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ill1 3 homeless people and their special search for housing.14
A disproportionate number of HIV-infected people suffer from a
loss of housing.15 New York City, where approximately eight thou-
sand of the estimated ninety thousand homeless people are persons
with AIDS ("PWA's"), 16 is an extreme example of the "emerging cri-
sis.' 17 The magnitude of this unique new problem is difficult to quan-
tify,18 but experts agree that "'[h]ousing is one of the biggest
13. HIV is an acronym for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, the retrovirus responsible for
causing Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). HIV-illness encompasses a
spectrum of disease with AIDS being the most severe. For a basic understanding of HIV-
illness, see infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
14. Special concerns arise because the number of homeless people with HIV-illness has
grown at a tremendous rate throughout the United States since 1981. Schulman, Thousands
May Die in the Streets, 248 THE NATION 480, 480 (1989). Moreover, the underlying issues of
stigmatization, discrimination, and the unique medical characteristics associated with HIV-
illness are particularly problematic.
15. Schietinger, Housing for People with AIDS, 12 DEATH STUDIES 481, 481-82 (1988)
(suggesting that the HIV-ill are left without homes because of: (1) rejection based on fear of
contagion; (2) rejection based on fear of the dying process; and (3) financial devastation
associated with HIV-illness and treatment).
16. In 1990, terminology in this area is still evolving. For example, scholars and advocates
have begun to use the terms HIV-illness and HIV-disease as they gain a better understanding
of the spectrum of disease that often culminates in AIDS. E.g., Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/
88, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989); Speech entitled Current Issues in AIDS Research
and Testing by Dr. Margaret Hamburg of the National Institute of Health, A.A.L.S. Joint
Program: Section on Gay and Lesbian Issues, Section on Law and Medicine, Section of Real
Property (Jan. 4, 1990); Speech entitled A Constitutional Right to Appropriate Housing-The
New York Litigation by Nan Hunter of the American Civil Liberties Union, A.A.L.S. Joint
Program: Section on Gay and Lesbian Issues, Section on Law and Medicine, Section on Real
Property (Jan. 4, 1990); City of New York Plan entitled Expansion of Services for the HIV-Ill,
submitted May 13, 1989, in connection with the Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Jan. 11, 1989), litigation. The term "person with AIDS" ("PWA") is favored by The
National Association for People with AIDS to describe the symptomatic HIV-ill. Founding
Statement of People with AIDS/ARC (The Denver Principles), reprinted in 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 743, 743 (1988). In its founding statement in 1983, this group
explained its preference in the opening paragraph: "We condemn attempts to label us as
'victims,' which implies defeat, and we are only occasionally 'patients,' which implies passivity,
helplessness, and dependence upon the care of others. We are 'people with AIDS.'" Id.
Another example of the evolving terminology is the term AIDS-related Complex ("ARC"),
which already has fallen into disuse. Albert, A Right to Treatment for AIDS Patients?, 92
DICK. L. REV. 743, 749 & n.49 (1988); see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
17. Schulman, supra note 14, at 480. Other studies claim that there is no way of knowing
how many homeless people with HIV-illness exist. For example, one writer states that the
dimension of the problem is unknown and that there are no estimates of the number of
homeless PWA's in New York City. Cheuvront, Double Jeopardy: Facing AIDS and
Homelessness, 13 CITY LIMITS, Feb. 1988, at 12, 13.
18. The quantification problem is compounded where, as here, each of the individual
components of the homeless HIV-infected population is inherently difficult to quantify. See
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 12 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]
(explaining that "[i]t is difficult to predict the number [of HIV-infected individuals] who will
develop ARC or AIDS because symptoms sometimes take as long as nine years to show up,"
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problems (facing PWA's) that isn't being addressed.' "19
Ideally, legislation should be enacted both on federal and state
levels to guarantee a minimum entitlement of medically-appropriate
housing for the HIV-ill. A push for legislation, however, requires a
strong, unified voice. Because of the overall political impotence and
powerlessness of today's homeless population,20 homeless PWA's lack
the requisite "constituency ... to effect majoritarian reform."'" As
past crises have illustrated, "individuals and politically ineffective
groups have traditionally had recourse to the courts where
majoritarian bodies have either violated or ignored their concerns. "22
and "[t]he majority of infected antibody positive individuals who carry the AIDS virus show
no disease symptoms and may not come down with the disease for many years."); Langdon &
Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROas. 305, 305 n.1 (1985) (noting that the nature of the homeless population makes it
impossible to count accurately the members of the population); Note, Establishing a Right to
Shelterfor the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 939, 939 n.3 (1984) (discussing the difficulty
in ascertaining "the numbers of homeless in a large city with any degree of precision" and
comparing recent calculations of homeless populations in specific cities).
Nevertheless, estimates are available. As of July 1989, approximately 100,000 cases of
AIDS were reported in the United States. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORTS ON HIV/AIDS, Jan.-Dec. 1989, at 176. In 1989,
35,238 new AIDS cases were reported to the Centers for Disease Control as compared to
32,196 AIDS cases reported in 1988. Schiffman, Total AIDS Cases Rose 9% in 1989,
According to U.S., Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at B4, col. 1. Because AIDS cases are
underdiagnosed and underreported, this represents merely the "minimum number of persons
with severe human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-related disease." CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, supra, at 176. The number of reported AIDS cases has helped researchers to
estimate that one to one and one-half million persons in the United States are HIV-infected.
Similarly, researchers use empirical data to estimate that the United States contains from
250,000 to three million homeless people. Comment, Homeless Families: Do They Have a
Right to Integrity?, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 159, 162 & n.12 (1987) (enumerating various agencies
and their estimates of the nationwide homeless population).
19. Cheuvront, supra note 17, at 12 (quoting Barbara Van Buren, former director of the
AIDS Services Delivery Consortium, a coalition of 29 public and private agencies that work
with the HIV-ill).
20. Note, supra note 18, at 940 n.8; see Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 89-90 (1987). In assessing the utility of litigation to promote
rights for the homeless, Hayes observes that litigation must be real and substantive with the
injunction as its main objective and that the plaintiffs must be able to withstand public
scrutiny. Id. at 88. Moreover, Hayes argues that legislative and regulatory proposals may
result in "more of the remedies sought by lawyer and client." Id. at 88-89; see also Note,
Hunger and Homelessness in America, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 277, 283 (1989) ("The greatest
potential for innovation in dealing with the problem rests with state legislatures."). Finally,
Hayes stresses that litigation should serve to educate the public. Hayes, supra, at 89.
21. Note, Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalization: Toward a
Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 1153, 1160 (1989)
(citing Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1315
(1976)); see Note, supra note 18, at 940 n.8 (noting that the homeless poor, as a rule, have
been characterized by almost complete political impotence as a political force).
22. Note, supra note 21, at 1171 (citing Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1308 & 1315 (1976)).
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Even though litigators for the homeless HIV-ill are faced with rather
unusual challenges because they represent a group suffering from
multiple stigmatization, 23 advocacy may be the most effective way 24 at
this time to improve conditions for the homeless HIV-ill.
This Comment explores potential legal avenues to provide medi-
cally-appropriate housing for the homeless HIV-ill. Section II pro-
vides background information regarding the distinct conditions of
homelessness and HIV-illness. This background enables the reader to
understand fully the unique characteristics of the homeless population
with HIV-illness. Section III describes and emphasizes the similari-
ties between the two major arguments employed in this Comment:
the right to shelter25 and the right to health care.26 Section IV exam-
ines existing law and concludes that the most promising judicial
approach for medically-appropriate housing is to establish a right to
shelter for all people within a jurisdiction. A line of cases known as
the "right to shelter" cases provides the legal foundation that home-
23. Stigmatization may be triple or quadruple as in the case of a drug-abusing, mentally ill,
homeless HIV-ill person. See, e.g., Breo, Treating the American Tragedy--MDs Try to Heal
the Sick Homeless, 263 J. A.M.A. 3201, 3201 (1990). For a brief discussion of stigmatization
of the homeless HIV-ill, see infra note 73.
24. While noting that advocacy groups have used litigation to improve conditions for
members of the homeless population in the past, Hayes opines that litigation is an ineffective
tool for these purposes. Hayes, Homelessness & the Legal Profession, 35 Loy. L. REV. 1, 1
(1989).
A common litigation problem which arises both at the relief stage and at the liability stage
is that the courts utilize the doctrines of justiciability, separation of powers, sovereign
immunity, and political question to declare a lack of subject matter jurisdiction (or standing).
Chackes, Sheltering the Homeless: Judicial Enforcement of Governmental Duties to the Poor, 31
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 93, 99 (1987). A classic example of overcoming the barrier
of the justiciability doctrine is found in the case of Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463
N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984), rev'g 91 A.D.2d 593, 458 N.Y.S.2d 190 (App. Div.
1982). In Klostermann, the plaintiffs challenged the city and state governments' failure to
create and enforce special discharge plans under the New York Mental Hygiene law, N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(f)-(h) (McKinney 1988), for released mentally disabled patients.
Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 532-33, 463 N.E.2d at 591-92, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250-51. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding that the claim was nonjusticiable by
recognizing the distinction "between a court's imposition of its own policy determination upon
its governmental partners[, which is nonjusticiable,] and its mere declaration and enforcement
of the individual's rights that have already been conferred by the other branches of
government[, which is justiciable]." Id. at 535, 463 N.E.2d at 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252. For
further discussion of Klostermann, see infra note 295.
25. One commentator defines the right to shelter as a governmental entity's duty "to
ensure that every person within the state who is homeless and requests shelter receives it," at
least on a temporary basis. Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in New York State, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 272 n.7 (1986).
26. Almost all jurisdictions have constitutional or statutory provisions that authorize or
mandate governmental entities to furnish some medical care for indigents. NATIONAL
HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, MANUAL ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE FOR INDIGENTS 5 (1985).
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lessness advocates need to secure emergency and permanent shelter
for the homeless. In support of the argument that medically-appro-
priate housing is a natural outgrowth of the right to shelter, Section
IV explores the exemplary New York case of Mixon v. Grinker2 7 in
detail. Section V recognizes an alternative and innovative analysis.
This analysis concludes that where a jurisdiction does not recognize a
right to shelter, advocates can argue that the judiciary should recog-
nize a right to shelter for the homeless as part of a duty to care for the
indigent sick. Admittedly, this approach is nontraditional and calls
for radical extensions of existing law. However, the argument is
intended to stimulate creativity. Moreover, Section VI furnishes a
nonlegal rationale for legislators and politicians who must appeal to
taxpayers. This rationale economically compares the cost-effective-
ness of home and community care to the expenses of hospitalization.
Finally, Section VII concludes that federal and state legislative reform
is necessary to obtain uniform and equitable results.
II. BACKGROUND: HOMELESSNESS AND AIDS
This Section demonstrates that the~ conditions of homelessness
and symptomatic HIV-infection are distinct, but lethal, concurrent
conditions. A disproportionate number of HIV-ill people suffer from
a loss of housing. 28 An understanding of the common characteristics
of the homeless and HIV-infected populations is essential to a recog-
nition of a right to medically-appropriate housing.
The homeless population is heterogeneous, consisting of several
subgroups that mirror the United States's indigent population. 29 The
evolving diversification is demonstrated by single men and women,
families with children, adolescents, minorities, and the elderly, who
have replaced the stereotypical white male alcoholics or drug addicts
on the streets and in shelters.a0 Although various definitions of home-
lessness have been posed,31 this Comment adopts the Stewart B.
27. No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989) (order granting preliminary injunction),
aff'd and modified on other grounds, 157 A.D.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1990)
(This decision marks the first time a court enjoined governmental officials from refusing to
provide medically-appropriate housing to the HIV-ill.).
28. Schietinger, supra note 15, at 481.
29. Stern, Serious Neglect: Housing for Homeless People with AIDS, CITY LIMITS, Apr.
1989, at 13.
30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH AND HUMAN NEEDS 18 (1988);
Comment, supra note 18, at 163; Note, supra note 20, at 279.
31. See Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 308 (defining the homeless as "those who have
no stable access to housing and who usually reside either in emergency temporary shelters
provided by local governments or private charities, or in various public places, including
streets, doorways, parks, public transportation terminals, and abandoned buildings");
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McKinney Homelessness Assistance Act's comprehensive defini-
tion.32 The McKinney Act defines a homeless person as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate night-
time residence; [or]
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is-
(A) a supervised or publicly operated shelter designed to pro-
vide temporary living accommodations (including welfare
hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional housing for the
mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for
individuals intended to be institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily
used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human
beings.33
Many homeless individuals seek refuge in public shelters, if avail-
able. 34  For example, in New York City, as many as one thousand
people are lodged in a single large space that one observer described
as "noisy, dirty, smelly, and . . . often either brutally hot or
underheated. ' ' a. Public shelters are usually closed during the day,
and adequate rest and nutrition are impossible for shelter residents.3 6
Long waits for food, showers, and clean clothes are common. 37
Moreover, sexual assaults against homeless women are highly
prevalent.38
As one study39 reports, homelessness and health care specifically
interact in three ways: (1) health problems cause homelessness;' (2)
McKittrick, The Homeless." Judicial Intervention on Behalf of a Politically Powerless Group, 16
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 389, 389 n.1 (1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1985)) (discussing broad definitions of homelessness and adopting the definition of "those
individuals and families who lack sufficient resources to provide for their own shelter");
Comment, An Overiew of Homelessness in America, 35 Loy. L. REV. 216, 217 (1989)
(discussing the difficulties in capturing the diversity of the homeless population in a single
definition).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (1988).
33. Id. § 11302(a).
34. Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 316-17.
35. Schulman, supra note 14, at 481.
36. Id
37. Id. at 480. The waits usually entail standing for long periods of time, and they are
physically taxing. Id.
38. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 41.
39. Sutherland, Health Care for the Homeless, ISSUES Sci. & TECH., Fall 1988, at 79.
40. Id. Although the most common medical antecedents to homelessness are the major
mental illnesses, physical problems also have substantial impact. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 30, at 39-40. For example, AIDS is likely to become another important cause of
homelessness, especially as its prevalence among intravenous drug abusers increases. Id. at 40;
see Complaint at para. 11, Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (alleging that the "occurrence of persistent and
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homelessness causes health problems;4' and (3) homelessness makes
health problems harder to treat. 42  A wide range of health care
problems afflicts members of the homeless population with greater
frequency than the general population. 3 These problems include a
disproportionate prevalence of HIV-illness among the homeless and
inadequate treatment facilities designed for the HIV-ill.'
Because AIDS has been identified as a cause of homelessness, 45 a
basic understanding of HIV-illness is essential to address properly this
recurring illness as one progresses along the HIV continuum is a main cause of homelessness
among the HIV-infected"), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INST., THE RIGHTS OF THE
HOMELESS 389, 393 (1988); Chackes, supra note 24, at 94 (discussing possible causes of
homelessness); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 41 (explaining that as HIV-
infection progresses and leads to repeated and more serious bouts with opportunistic
infections, an individual typically becomes unable to work and to pay rent; and that in extreme
cases, homelessness results); Turkel, Representing People with AIDS, in AIDS LEGAL GUIDE
1-1 (A. Rubenfeld 2d ed. 1987) (explaining that by the time an attorney meets a client with
AIDS, the client has lost most "personal assets, due in part to enormity of... medical
expenses"); cf Hayes, supra note 24, at 5 (arguing that governmental decisions during the
1980's inevitably resulted in increased homelessness). Other health problems that contribute
to homelessness include alcoholism and drug dependence, disabling conditions, major illnesses,
and employment-related injuries. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 40.
41. Lave, Band-Aid Solutions, 26 Soc'y, May-June 1989, at 11 (Because "the health
problems of the homeless are both caused by and exacerbated by their homeless state,"
remedying the health care problems is only a Band-aid solution.); Sutherland, supra note 39, at
80 (Street people "rarely have the opportunity to lie down, and hence suffer from a
disproportionate number of problems" unique to their situations.).
42. Sutherland, supra note 39, at 80. Most routine medical treatments are often impossible
for the homeless. Id. Because most homeless individuals do not eat properly, careful dietary
control is out of the question. Id.
43. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 41.
44. Thousands of individuals with HIV-infection live in shelters or on the streets and do
not receive any medical care at all. Schulman, supra note 14, at 481. Ten percent of New
York City's shelter residents is estimated to have AIDS. Drapkin, Medical Problems of the
Homeless, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 92 (C. Caton ed. 1990). The AIDS unit of the New
York City Commission on Human Rights has received numerous reports about hospitalized
HIV-ill people being evicted by their former landlords upon release from the hospital because
they were unable to pay rent. Cheuvront, supra note 17, at 12. The commission ranks such
cases as among its most devastating because " 'not only [does] the person with AIDS have to
cope with a swift decline in health but also [has] to face the possibility of having nowhere to
live during the crisis period.'" Id. (quoting a report of the New York City Commission on
Human Rights AIDS Unit).
45. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 30, at 40. According to the recommendations of
the Committee on Health Care for Homeless People, all homeless people should have stable
residences. Lave, supra note 41, at 11. AIDS is just another "health care problem" which
need not be singled out for special attention. Id. Nonetheless, there are valid reasons why the
homeless HIV-ill need special consideration even beyond that of a healthy homeless person.
See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. Indeed, the health care financing system's
tendency to categorize and to function by classifying separate groups supports the proposition
that advocates should pursue housing and special treatment for the homeless HIV-ill. See
Benjamin, Long-Term Care and AIDS: Perspectives from Experience with the Elderly, 66
MILBANK Q. 415, 417 (1988).
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aspect of the homelessness problem.' HIV attacks the body's
immune defense system.47 When HIV enters the blood stream, the
infected person's body enters a seropositive state,4 8 producing antibo-
dies which can be detected in that person's blood usually two weeks to
three months after infection.4 9 Once infected with HIV, a person may
remain in a seropositive state,50 or may develop AIDS.5 AIDS is
simply the final stage of a series of health problems along the spec-
trum of disease caused by HIV.52 "Full-blown AIDS"'53 is the most
serious condition caused by HIV whereby the immune system col-
lapses, and infectious "'opportunistic diseases,' "' such as Kaposi's
sarcoma, invade the body. 5
46. As stated previously, HIV is an acronym for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, the
retrovirus that causes AIDS. See supra note 13. Scientists have also called this virus HTLV-
III, or Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III, and LAY, or Lymphadenopathy Associated
Virus. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. Surgeon General Koop refers to
HIV as the "AIDS virus." Id.
47. Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE
PUBLIC 28 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987). For a capsulized explanation of the medical
facts of AIDS and a description of HIV's invasion of the T-Lymphocytes or T-helper cells, see
id. at 29-31.
48. In the seropositive state, blood tests indicate infection with HIV by revealing the
presence of HIV antibodies. Id. at 29.
49. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 10. A simple test is used to detect
the antibodies. Id.
50. Albert, supra note 16, at 748-49. At this stage, the individual's immune system is
under attack, but continues to function. Despite a lack of symptoms, the individual is capable
of transmitting the virus. Id. "A critical but unresolved question is whether an individual can
remain in this first stage indefinitely or if the disease always progresses to the point when
disease symptoms appear." Id. at 749 (discussing scientific studies and their respective
conclusions).
51. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11; Green, supra note 47, at 30.
52. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. However, it is too soon in the
history of this syndrome to determine whether all or most people infected with HIV will
develop AIDS. See S. SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 29 (1989). Seropositive
individuals with clinical symptoms less severe than those associated with AIDS originally were
said to suffer from AIDS-related complex ("ARC"), which "causes moderate damage to the
immune system." Green, supra note 47, at 30. This term's use has declined, and the condition
it describes is now generally considered to be AIDS, albeit a milder form. Albert, supra note
16, at 749 & n.49. Some people have died from ARC without ever having contracted AIDS.
Stem, supra note 29, at 13. The federal Centers for Disease Control (the "CDC") regards the
distinction between AIDS and ARC as artificial. Id.
53. S. SONTAG, supra note 52, at 28-29 (defining "full-blown" as the "form in which the
disease is inevitably fatal").
54. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 10. Germs that would ordinarily be
fought off by a healthily functioning immune system "us[e] the opportunity of [the body's]
lowered resistance to infect and destroy." Id. These germs include bacteria, protozoa, fungi,
and other viruses and cancers. Id. Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, tuberculosis, and
Kaposi's sarcoma are some of the most common diseases caused by HIV and germ infection.
Id.
55. See Green, supra note 47, at 30.
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Because of the wide range of physical responses to HIV infection,
it is impossible to characterize the symptoms of AIDS in an all-
encompassing phrase or sentence. 6 HIV-disease, an episodic illness,
is characterized by periods of both acuteness and relative health."7
Symptoms may take years to develop and could appear as "memory
loss, indifference, loss of coordination, partial paralysis or mental dis-
orders.""8 Furthermore, symptoms "may include a persistent cough
and fever associated with shortness of breath or difficult breathing."5 9
Chronic diarrhea and other intestinal disorders are common. 60
Kaposi's sarcoma, which causes visible purplish skin lesions to appear
on the body, is also a common ailment.6'
Finally, although AIDS per se is not transmissible, infection with
HIV can be transmitted. 62 HIV is transmitted under very limited cir-
cumstances,63 including sexual contact,6' exchange of blood,65 and
perinatal events.66 There is absolutely no risk, however, from casual
56. Indeed, individuals may react differently to HIV-infection. SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.
57. Lambert, Places for AIDS Patients Are Still Scarce, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at E6,
col. I.
58. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 12. Long-term manifestations of
AIDS might include delayed brain damage resulting from an attack on the nervous system.
Id.
59. Id. at 11-12. Symptoms of what used to be known as ARC, see supra note 52, often
include loss of appetite, weight loss, fever, night sweats, skin rashes, diarrhea, fatigue, lack of
resistance to infection, or swollen lymph nodes. Id. at 11; see also Green, supra note 47, at 30.
60. Schulman, supra note 14, at 481.
61. Persons afflicted with Kaposi's sarcoma need privacy in bathing to maintain dignity
and confidentiality. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification at 11, Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/88 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law]. Discrimination among shelter
residents is rampant. For example, one of the Mixon plaintiffs could stay only one night at a
shelter because other residents, who observed his skin lesions in the group showers, threatened
him. This is psychologically, as well as physically, damaging. Id at 8; see also Schulman,
supra note 14, at 480.
62. Krim, Preface to AIDS LEGAL GUIDE at P-1 (A. Rubenfeld 2d ed. 1987).
63. Green, supra note 47, at 31.
64. Albert, supra note 16, at 748; Green, supra note 47, at 31-32.
65. Green, supra note 47, at 32-33. Intravenous drug abusers, for example, commonly
transmit HIV through the sharing of infected needles. Id. at 32. Among the homeless, drug
use often is open and widespread in shelters. Kolata, Twins of the Streets: Homelessness and
Addiction, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 2, A13, col. 1. Shelters apparently worsen
the drug problem. Id. Many homeless advocates do not publicly discuss the problem of
addiction because they fear that the public would lose its sympathy for the homeless. Id. at
AI, col. 3.
66. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 20. Prenatal infection is
demonstrated by HIV-infected children born to HIV-infected mothers. Lifson, Do Alternate
Modes for Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exist?, 259 J. A.M.A. 1353, 1355
(1988). The possibility of postnatal infection from breast-feeding "continues to be evaluated."
Id. at 1353.
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contact.67
The realities associated with a homeless person's daily existence
starkly contrast with the daily needs of a symptomatic HIV-infected
person. Once a homeless person becomes HIV-infected, the develop-
ment of AIDS is likely to be accelerated by malnutrition and repeated
infections. 6  Homeless people commonly suffer from "inadequate
food and nutrition, a clothing shortage, physical violence and sexual
victimization, poor physical and mental health, alcoholism or alcohol
abuse, and inadequate job and life skills." 69 At the very least, an
HIV-infected person needs adequate food and nutrition,70 a psycho-
logically safe environment,71 and plenty of rest to combat fatigue.72
The tendency for the general public to attach a stigma to those with
HIV-illness also adds to the misfortunes of the homeless HIV-ill.73
The estimated survival time of a PWA has become longer
67. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 13. Even where family members of
an HIV-ill person shared food, towels, cups, razors, and toothbrushes, and kissed each other,
there was no evidence of HIV transmission. Id.; see Green, supra note 47, at 33-36.
68. Repeated infections, in turn, lead to activation of the T4 lymphocyte, resulting in
replication of the HIV virus, death of the cell, compromise of the immune system, and
subsequent development of AIDS. Drapkin, supra note 44, at 31.
69. Chackes, supra note 24, at 94.
70. A high-protein diet is frequently recommended. Rovner, Nutrition: Key in AIDS
Care, Wash. Post (Health), Sept. 26, 1989, at 8.
71. Dealing with the knowledge of a terminal illness is aggravated by having to deal with a
crisis situation everyday, such as trying to find a place to sleep, food to eat, and clean clothes to
wear. Rosenthal, Health Care for the Homeless: Treating the Byproducts of Life on the Streets,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1990, at B9, col. 1. "'The homeless are struggling for survival so much
of the day ....... Id. (quoting Dr. Mark Dollar, who specializes in treating the homeless); see
also supra note 61.
72. Schulman, supra note 14, at 480 (quoting a homeless PWA who could not obtain
proper rest or nutrition in a shelter, and, thus, returned to the streets where his AIDS-related
skin lesions worsened to the point that he could not stand in food lines).
73. For example, despite medical data describing the limited transmissibility of HIV
infection, "the public treats AIDS as though it were a highly contagious disease spread by a
wide range of [everyday] activities." Green, supra note 47, at 28-29 (relating several incidents
illustrating the public's panic surrounding AIDS). Many shelters for the homeless around the
country categorically exclude HIV-ill persons. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
FIGHTING TO LIVE: HOMELESS PEOPLE WITH AIDS v (1990).
Stigmatization is perpetuated by the fact that "AIDS has hit hardest persons of color,
members of the gay community, IV [intravenous] drug users and homeless youth." Id. at iv.
For example, in New York City, the homeless HIV-ill are presently being placed in special
medical sections of large public shelters where the HIV-ill residents are referred to by the other
residents with "anti-homosexual epithets." Lambert, Amid Protests, Dinkins Plans AIDS
Shelters, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at A15, col. 6. Advocates strongly urge providers to
develop HIV-dedicated facilities which arguably would be more efficient and offer better
services than integrated facilities. Speech entitled A Constitutional Right to Appropriate
Housing-The New York Litigation by Nan Hunter of the American Civil Liberties Union,
A.A.L.S. Joint Program: Section on Gay and Lesbian Issues, Section on Law & Medicine,
Section on Real Property (Jan. 4, 1990). However, HIV-dedicated facilities tend to reinforce
the stigma associated with HIV-disease. Id.
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because scientists "can respond with more appropriate symptomatic
treatment ' 4 as they continue to learn more about the disease."
Treatment, however, is still in the experimental stages.7 6 Drug ther-
apy, such as zidovudine ("AZT"), has serious side effects." Although
development of a vaccine against AIDS is theoretically possible, soci-
ety should respond to the AIDS epidemic with the assumption that a
vaccine may not be available in the foreseeable future.78
Aggravation of HIV-illness takes different forms depending upon
the infected individual's living situation. Public shelters are not safe
for HIV-ill individuals.79 The greatest danger to a person whose
immune system is suppressed by HIV-infection is proximity to dis-
eases that can be easily transferred among people through casual con-
tact. 0 Non-HIV-infected homeless persons commonly complain
about infectious diseases,8 ' which worsen because of the homelessness
condition. 82 The incidence of tuberculosis, for example, is dispropor-
tionately high among shelter residents and people living on the
streets.83 The HIV-ill are in great danger of developing full-blown
AIDS when placed in shelters where the incidence of infectious dis-
eases is very high. Alternatively, the HIV-ill who stay away from
shelters because of violence or poor conditions live in alleys, under
bridges, in subways, and on benches. They encounter formidable
obstacles in obtaining showers, adequate rest, and nutritional meals,
which also puts them in great danger of developing full-blown
AIDS. 4 Because life on the streets offers harsh exposure to natural
74. Albert, supra note 16, at 749-50 (noting that scientists can better diagnose AIDS
because they understand it more fully).
75. See Krim, supra note 62, at P-1 to P-3 (discussing the success of AIDS educational
programs).
76. Albert, supra note 16, at 751.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
80. Memorandum of Law, supra note 61, at 14-15.
81. Collins, Health for the Homeless: Miami Physician Takes Care to the Streets, AM.
MED. NEWS, Feb. 3, 1989, at 19.
82. Rosenthal, supra note 71, at B9, col. 1.
83. Collins, supra note 81, at 19.
84. Id. These obstacles result in "'poor hygiene, no showers, no change of clothes, and[,
thus,] what [the homeless] get they can't get rid of.'" Id. (quoting Dr. Pedro Jose Greer, a
physician who regularly treats the homeless at Miami's Camillus Health Concern).
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elements,85 lack of personal security,8 6 and susceptibility to disease, 7
it is easy to understand why the emerging new crisis is a growing
number of homeless HIV-ill. The most effective way to quell the cri-
sis is to provide adequate shelter and appropriate health care
concurrently.
III. OVERVIEW: PARALLELS IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT
TO SHELTER AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
Lacking both a home and easy access to appropriate medical
services places the homeless HIV-ill in a unique situation worthy of
special consideration. Existing law does not address effectively this
particular mixture of misery, which afflicts thousands of Americans.
Very few plaintiffs have attempted to enforce both a right to shelter
and a right to health care.s" To a limited extent, each of these rights
has been separately established under state constitutions and state
statutes.8 9 Under the proper circumstances-that is, under a combi-
nation of constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations, along
with a judiciary willing to liberally construe them-governmental
duties to the poor can be found under existing law to include medi-
cally-appropriate housing' and other "life-sustaining services." 91
There is no federal constitutional right to shelter.92 Similarly,
neither the United States Supreme Court nor any federal court of
appeals has recognized a federal constitutional right to health or
health care."3 Although the federal government has not acted on
85. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979),
aff'd mem., 118 A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1986).
86. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 61, at 10, 12; see, e.g., NATIONAL COALITION
FOR THE HOMELESS, ENDING THE SILENCE: %VOICES OF HOMELESS PEOPLE LIVING WITH
AIDS 20 (June 1990) (transcript of testimony by Ervin Marrero to the United States House of
Representatives, Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Housing
and Community Development Hearings on Homelessness and AIDS).
87. Collins, supra note 81, at 19.
88. See infra notes 126-84 & 224-35 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 95.
90. See infra notes 200-23 and accompanying text.
91. Chackes, supra note 24, at 94.
92. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating that "[w]e do not denigrate the
importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill .... Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing... [is a] legislative, not judicial, functionfl."); see Note, supra
note 18, at 943 & n.23.
93. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Banks, supra note 3, at 160 n.53 (citing
Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under Medicare Prospective Payment System: One
Administrative Modelfor Allocating Medical Resources Under a Government Health Insurance
Program, 19 IND. L. REV. 1151, 1157 (1986)); Metcalfe, Indigent Health Care in Saint Louis,
32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1075, 1084 & n.70 (1988). '
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these matters,94 state courts have relied on state constitutions and
state statutes to impose duties on governmental entities." Moreover,
state legislatures have the power to establish such duties. In the
establishment of these duties, some of the paramount issues to be con-
sidered by legislators and, eventually, the courts are the scope of the
government's obligation, and the ability and willingness of courts to
dictate the means of implementation to the appropriate governmental
entities. 96
Some commentators argue that once these duties have been stat-
utorily established, courts should construe the statutes liberally. 97
94. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced the Health Security Act in 1970,
but Congress never enacted it into law. Banks, supra note 3, at 161 (citing 116 CONG. REC.
30142 (1970)).
95. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 5; e.g., Callahan v. Carey,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979) (holding that all homeless
men have a right to emergency housing under the laws and constitution of New York), aff'd
mem., 118 A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1986); Metcalfe, supra note 93, at 1085-
86 (discussing the statutory duties to provide health care to indigents of Missouri local
governments).
Courts have relied on state statutes to impose a "duty to relieve the poor," Chackes, supra
note 24, at 105, for both general and discrete groups. Comment, supra note 31, at 239
(discussing Turner v. City of New Orleans, No. 87-8281 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish, La.,
May 12, 1987), where plaintiffs challenged state statutory provisions).
96. Courts first look to the express language of the statutory or constitutional provisions to
determine the scope of the duty. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 6-7;
Metcalfe, supra note 93, at 1085. Courts also examine legislative intent and judicial
interpretations of the provisions. Id. Moreover, courts should interpret a statute "in the light
of some assumed purpose." Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
Courts often examine a statute's policy, which includes the drafter's conscious ideas as well as
circumstances "utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage." Id. As time passes between
a statute's enactment and its subsequent interpretation, courts tend to examine the statute's
broader purposes in light of the new situation. Id. Thus, courts have good cause to reevaluate
state statutes in light of new circumstances: the increase in the homeless HIV-ill population
and the move away from former stereotypes.
An important interpretive issue regarding the scope of rights and duties is whether
relevant statutory provisions impose mandatory or discretionary duties. NATIONAL HEALTH
LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 5-6. Legislatures "frequently use the word 'shall' to specify
the 'mandatory' nature of the duty." Chackes, supra note 24, at 106 (footnote omitted); see,
e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980). Some discretionary statutes merely
authorize or enable governmental entities to provide care for the poor. NATIONAL HEALTH
LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 6; see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-2308 (1987). For
example, where a governmental entity violates a clear statutory mandate as to welfare benefits,
courts usually order modification of the benefits. Chackes, supra note 24, at 112. Where a
governmental entity's conduct is clearly discretionary, courts ordinarily uphold the conduct,
unless the conduct "conflict[s] with the statute, or . . . is unreasonable or arbitrary and
capricious." Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
97. Chackes, supra note 24, at 113; see SUTHERLAND & SAND'S STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 71.08 (4th ed. 1972). The California Supreme Court has cited with
approval legislation mandating that indigents' rights and duties should be liberally construed.
Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 676 n.8, 483 P.2d 1231, 1236 n.8, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 284 n.8
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They believe that the remedial purposes of state poor laws can best be
achieved by broadening both the class of indigent beneficiaries and the
scope of rights to which indigents are entitled. Some judges who
believe the problem of homelessness requires a judicial solution
already have been broadly interpreting these statutes.98 Certain
judges have had to be more creative than others, however, because the
statutory and constitutional provisions on which courts have relied to
establish indigents' rights to emergency health care and temporary
shelter vary in terms of their specificity. In the area of health care,
some state courts have interpreted broadly statutes of general authori-
zation to impose mandatory duties on governmental entities to pro-
vide indigents with health care.99 Other health care provisions are
explicitly aimed at a particular segment of the population so that
broad judicial construction is unnecessary."o Similarly, in finding a
right to shelter, some courts have imposed a duty to provide shelter
based upon statutes that did not even expressly refer to shelter
rights," I or which had merely an incidental reference to shelter. 0 2 In
other cases, broad construction was, again, unnecessary because the
statutes specifically required shelter to be provided. 0 a
The question of relief often is litigated subsequent to the judicial
or legislative establishment of a right to health care or shelter. 1°4
(1971) (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11000 (West 1965), amended by CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11000 (West Supp. 1991) (changing the standard from "liberally" to "fairly and
equitably" construed)). Courts have utilized liberal construction to broaden the classes of
beneficiaries under applicable statutes. See Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir.
Ct. 1985); Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
98. See McKittrick, supra note 31, at 407-08.
99. E.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Navajo County, 67 Ariz. 172, 167 P.2d 113 (1946). At
least 14 states have statutes that do not explicitly mention medical care. NATIONAL HEALTH
LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 6 n.18. However, courts have interpreted provisions "for
relief,' 'support,' or 'maintenance' of the poor to include medical care." Id. at 6.
100. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980). This statutory provision
explicitly creates a duty for every California city and county to provide health care to indigent
California residents.
101. E.g., McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc. 2d 20, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1984), modified,
117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div.), appeal granted, 121 A.D.2d 997, 503
N.Y.S.2d 997 (App. Div. 1986), later proceeding, 68 N.Y.2d 713, 497 N.E.2d 679, 506
N.Y.S.2d 312, rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987); Callahan v.
Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), aff'd mem., 118
A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1986); see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 ("The
aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from
time to time determine.").
102. E.g., Maticka v. Atlantic City, 216 N.J. Super. 434, 524 A.2d 416 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987); Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
103. E.g., Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); Klostermann v.
Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
104. In litigation involving the homeless, extraordinary writs like injunction and mandamus
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Claims that arise under state poor laws can be categorized either as
level-of-benefits or denial-of-benefits cases.105 A level-of-benefits case
involves a judicial interpretation as to whether the nature and amount
of benefits provided by the governmental entity meets the statutory
mandate. 6 A denial-of-benefits case involves a challenge to the
allegedly improper refusal to provide benefits to individuals based on
the discretionary eligibility limitations imposed by the governmental
entity.'"° Courts are less likely to intervene in a level-of-benefits case
because certain discretionary decisions by governmental entities are
nonjusticiable. °8 Even where the justiciability doctrine is inapplica-
ble, courts are reluctant to fashion remedies which might encroach
upon the province of other governmental branches. 'I However, as
noted by the New York Court of Appeals, the judiciary must be able
to distinguish "between a court's imposition of its own policy determi-
nation upon its governmental partners[, which is nonjusticiable,] and
its mere declaration and enforcement of the individual's rights that
have already been conferred by the other branches of government[,
which is justiciable]."' °10 Of course, it is easier to argue a denial-of-
benefits case. If the court finds that a governmental entity improperly
denied relief, it can more easily fashion an appropriate remedy.III An
example of the judicial interpretation of a state law may prove illus-
trative for advocates in other states. In California, for example, indi-
gent plaintiffs in a level-of-benefits case prevailed where a county
government arbitrarily and capriciously reduced the county's general
assistance levels for indigent county residents." 2 A California court
are typically utilized. Chackes, supra note 24, at 96 (citing D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P.
SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 767 (2d ed. 1983)). In
both types of actions, plaintiffs must prove, inter alia, the existence of a legal right on the part
of the plaintiff. Id. at 96, 98.
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id. at 112.
107. Id. at 107.
108. Id. at 110-11. The responsible officials may argue that the separation of powers or
political question doctrine bars judicial review. Id. at 111.
109. Id. at 113. Courts refuse to "issue[] specific directions to... responsible government
officials telling them how to restructure programs or at what level to set future benefits." Id.
Where appropriate, however, courts have declared that existing levels of benefits conflict with
statutory mandates, id., and some courts "have gone a... step farther and explicitly ordered
government officials to set new levels of benefits in accordance with . . . statutory
requirements." Id.
110. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 535, 463 N.E.2d 588, 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247,
252 (1984); see Chackes, supra note 24, at 118-19. For a discussion of Klostermann and the
justiciability issue, see infra note 295.
111. Chackes, supra note 24, at 107 ("[T]he grant or denial of benefits is a two-dimensional
choice.").
112. Boehm v. County of Merced, 163 Cal. App. 3d 447, 453, 209 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (Ct.
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of appeal held that "minimum subsistence" included allocations for
housing and medical care, II3 and that "aid" included necessities of life
such as food, housing, utilities, clothing, transportation, and medical
care. '14 This decision supports the proposition that judicial interpre-
tations of existing statutes may establish a sufficiently broad govern-
mental duty to provide both housing and medical services for the
homeless.
Arguably, the provision of medically-appropriate housing for the
HIV-ill falls into the denial-of-benefits category. Some courts have
defined shelter to require protection from health-threatening situa-
tions. 115 Under this definition, the housing that governmental entities
typically provide for homeless people does not constitute shelter for
the HIV-ill.1 6 This is because the HIV-ill are constantly placed in
jeopardy of contracting infectious diseases that speed the final collapse
of their immune systems by simply being in casual contact with per-
sons suffering from or carrying infectious diseases. Governmental
entities, then, regularly deny the rights of the HIV-ill.
Reliance on existing state constitutions and statutes to provide a
legal right to shelter is likely to result in the "haphazard, uneven pro-
vision of shelter."'" 7 The outcome of such litigation depends on the
precision of applicable laws, the local political climate, and the con-
servativism or liberality of the judiciary at a given time."' Similarly,
the extent of a local government's legal responsibility to provide shel-
ter and medical services to indigents remains uncertain." 9 For this
reason, legislative reform is heralded as a necessary step in the clarifi-
cation of governmental duties. 2° Major federal legislation holds the
most potential for success because the resulting uniformity would
App. 1985), later approved sub nom. Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 716 (Ct. App. 1986).
113. Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720. "Medical care... include[s]
care 'for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.' " Comment,
The Duty of California Counties to Provide Mental Health Care for the Indigent and Homeless,
25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 197, 211 (1988) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (5th ed.
1979)).
114. Boehm, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
115. See, e.g., Barnes v. Koch, 136 Misc. 2d 96, 101, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
116. Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989), aff'd and modified on
other grounds, 157 A.D.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1990); cf McCain v. Koch, 70
N.Y.2d 109, 120, 511 N.E.2d 62, 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923 (1987) (citing McCain v. Koch,
127 Misc. 2d 20, 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1984)). See generally Chackes, supra
note 24, at 120-21 (discussing the McCain decision).
117. Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 348.
118. Id.
119. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 37.
120. Id.
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help to achieve consistent and long-lasting results. 2 '
Under existing laws, the right to medically-appropriate housing
may be established more successfully with a right to shelter argument
than with a right to health care argument. Indeed, Mixon v.
Grinker,122 the only successful right to medically-appropriate housing
case for HIV-ill individuals, relied upon the right to shelter cases in
New York. 123 At this time, an attempt to extend existing law has
more potential for success than an attempt to create a new legal
right. 24
In other jurisdictions that may not recognize a right to shelter,
many have established methods for indigents to obtain health care.125
Because the right to health care argument to establish the right to
medically-appropriate housing is a more targeted approach that
emphasizes only the HIV-ill and not other homeless individuals,
courts may more readily accept the need for a limited right to hous-
ing. In these jurisdictions, the argument that certain types of housing
with minimal support services are more cost-effective and humane
than hospitalization may prove useful.
IV. THE RIGHT TO SHELTER ARGUMENT
A. Establishing the Right
Commentators differ when estimating the potential for success in
establishing a legal right to shelter using existing state statutes and
constitutions. 26 While some of the state statutes specifically provide
121. McKittrick, supra note 31, at 423.
122. No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 157
A.D.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1990).
123. Id. For an analysis of Mixon, see infra notes 200-23 and accompanying text.
124. In Mixon, plaintiffs' counsel emphasized that they were "not inviting the Court to
create a new right or to engage in the type of discretionary resource allocation and priority
setting which the justiciability doctrine reserves to the executive branch." Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification at 2-3, Mixon v. Grinker, No.
14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989).
125. See infra notes 225-313 and accompanying text.
126. Some commentators are skeptical about the use of state statutes to establish a legal
right to shelter. See Note, supra note 18, at 946. "[J]udges in jurisdictions less liberal than
New York may be reluctant to interpret general statutory language to imply an enforceable
right to shelter." Id. (citing K. Hopper & L. Cox, Litigation in Advocacy for the Homeless:
The Case of New York City 3-4 (May 1982) (unpublished report)). One commentator
concluded that the successful establishment of a right to shelter for the homeless in Callahan v.
Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), aff'd mem., 118
A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1986), was a fluke. Id. at 947. Furthermore, in
1986, a New York federal district court noted that "whether the homeless have a right to
shelter [under the New York Constitution] is extremely unclear." Weiser v. Koch, 632 F.
Supp. 1369, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460, 1466-67
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for housing or shelter, 127 none of the state constitutions explicitly do
SO.12 The constitutions of New York1 29 and Montana, 30 however,
come the closest by setting forth an affirmative governmental obliga-
tion to provide for indigents. 3' The following summary of the differ-
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985)). Other commentators are more certain
that the right to shelter is established after Callahan and its progeny. For example, one
commentator has argued that article XVII, section 1 of the New York Constitution guarantees
a right to shelter for the homeless. Note, supra note 25, at 272-73.
Langdon and Kass identify two categories of statutes under which they surmise that an
obligation to provide shelter for homeless persons exists: general assistance ("GA") and adult
protective services. Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 324. They concede, however, that
most city and state governments have admitted to no more than a moral duty. Id. at 323.
They refer to one state (West Virginia), four counties (Los Angeles in California, and Orange,
Westchester, and Dutchess in New York), and two cities (New York City and Atlantic City)
that have accepted legal responsibility for sheltering the homeless. Id. at 323 n.93. State GA
programs differ as to recipients' eligibility requirements and benefit levels, but they usually
provide for minimal aid to those persons considered to be truly needy. Id. at 325. The
statutory language regarding eligibility determines the scope of a state's duty-that is, whether
the state must include shelter in its provisions for the homeless. Id. at 326. Most GA statutes
"do not expressly identify shelter as one of the forms of assistance that state or local
governments have the power to provide to the poor," id. at 327, because these statutes only
impose general obligations "to provide [the] poor with whatever support is necessary and
appropriate." Id. In states in which a court may broadly construe the state GA law or county
"poor law," it may impose a governmental obligation "to provide either shelter or the funds
necessary to procure shelter." Id.
127. Eg., Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); Klostermann v.
Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
128. See Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 332-33.
129. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid, care and support of the needy are public
concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner
and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.").
130. MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (providing that "[tihe legislature may provide such
economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of age,
infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the legislature to be in need"); see id. art. II, § 3
(stating that a person's inalienable rights include "the right to a clean and healthful
environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties, . . . and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways").
131. Cf Hayes, supra note 20, at 80 (New York and Montana are the only two states
"whose constitutions provide a basis for an affirmative obligation to do something for citizens
who are in need."). Other state constitutions also arguably "contain language which
unambiguously obligates the government to provide for the needs of the poor." Langdon &
Kass, supra note 18, at 333; see, e.g., ALA. CONST. art IV, § 88 ("It shall be the duty of the
legislature to require the several counties of this state to make adequate provision for the
maintenance of the poor."); KAN. CONST. art. 7, § 4 ("The respective counties of the state
shall provide, as may be prescribed by law, for those inhabitants who, by reason of age,
infirmity or other misfortune, may have claims upon the aid of society."); OKLA. CONST. art.
17, § 3 ("The several counties of the State shall provide, as may be prescribed by law, for those
inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity, or misfortune, may have claims upon the
sympathy and aid of the county."). Moreover, at least "seventeen state constitutions contain[]
some provision concerning a right to aid for the poor." Comment, supra note 31, at 238 (citing
Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 232).
New Jersey has addressed extensively the issue of a constitutional right to shelter.
Comment, supra note 31, at 238. In Railroad v. New Brunswick Mun. Welfare Dep't, Nos. A-
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ent types of claims that have been successful provides the legal
foundation for the recognition of a right to medically-appropriate
housing based on an established right to shelter.
New York's litigation and interpretive case law is among the
nation's most well-developed in the area of homelessness. 132 In the
1979 decision of Callahan v. Carey,133 a New York trial court first
recognized a right to emergency housing.134 The plaintiffs, homeless
men, 135 claimed that existing federal, state, and city laws created a
mandatory duty for governmental officials to provide adequate emer-
gency housing for all homeless men "seeking lodging and shelter and
meals."' 136  Initially, the court granted a preliminary injunction,
ordering the public officials to submit a plan for the provision of shel-
ter, including bed and board, for all homeless men who applied for
it. 137 In so holding, the court cited four types of express legal authori-
ties: (1) a provision of the New York State Constitution acknowledg-
ing that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns
S.. [that] shall be provided by the state";138 (2) sections of the New
York Social Services Law providing that each public welfare district
is responsible for the assistance and care of needy persons within its
territory,' 39 and that social services officials have the duty to care for
those "unable to maintain themselves" 1" and to utilize community
4439-85T5, A-4733-85T4 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Dec. 8, 1986) (consolidated), petition for
certification denied, 111 N.J. 638, 546 A.2d 550 (1988), a New Jersey appellate court
concluded that no state constitutional right to shelter exists. Id.; see Comment, supra note 31,
at 238 (citing Connell, A Right to Emergency Shelter for the Homeless Under the New Jersey
Constitution, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 765, 800 (1987)). This was "the first appellate level decision to
reach this conclusion." Id.
132. Hayes, supra note 24, at 2 (discussing pending litigation in Louisiana and the
similarities between the New York and Louisiana statutes).
133. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), aff'd mem., 118
A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1986).
134. Hayes, supra note 20, at 81; Hayes, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that the Callahan case
was the first time that a court held that a right to subsistence exists); see Comment, supra note
31, at 234.
135. Class action certification was denied on the grounds that it was unnecessary. The
defendants were governmental officials, "and any resolution of the case adverse to the
government would, by stare decisis, bind the government in its dealings with the prospective
class members." McKittrick, supra note 31, at 404 n.96 (citing Callahan, N.Y.L.J., July 18,
1980, at 6, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)).
136. Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 11, col. 5 (citing N.Y. CONsT. art. XVII, § 1).
139. Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 62(1) (McKinney 1983) ("(E]ach public welfare
district shall be responsible for the assistance and care of any person who resides or is found in
its territory and who is in need of public assistance and care which he is unable to provide for
himself.")).
140. Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 1983) ("It shall be the duty of
social service officials. . . to provide adequately for those unable to maintain themselves .... "
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resources to keep families together;'141 (3) a section of the New York
City Administrative Code requiring the city to provide shelter to
every needy applicant;142 and (4) a New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion 14 3 that stated that the New York counties have a duty to aid
destitute people even when the higher levels of government refuse to
share the cost.'" The Callahan court, however, ultimately based its
recognition of the right to emergency shelter primarily on public pol-
icy concerns over the health risks that living on the streets posed to
homeless people. 45  In reaching its decision, the court heard and
extensively cited witnesses 1" who testified that homeless men suffered
frostbite and death from exposure to the elements in previous
winters. 147
"After six months of protracted fighting and bickering"1 48
between the Coalition for the Homeless and the City of New York,
the parties settled, and the court issued a final judgment in the form of
a consent decree.' 49 The consent decree mandated shelter and board
Furthermore, the goal of the officials, "whenever possible, [is to] administer such care,
treatment and service as may restore such persons to a condition of self-support or self-care,
and [to] further give such service to those liable to become destitute as may prevent the
necessity of their becoming public charges.")).
141. Id. (citing N.Y. SOCIAL SERV. LAW § 131(3) (McKinney 1983) (stating that in
providing services to "maintain and strengthen family life[,] ... the public welfare official may
utilize appropriate community resources" and that "[w]henever practicable, assistance and
service shall be given a needy person in his own home")).
142. Id (citing N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 604.1.0(b) (n.d.), reprinted in 3 N.Y. CrrY
CHARTER AND CODE 455 (1978)). The New York City Administrative Code states:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner or of the superintendent of any
municipal lodging house acting under him, to provide for any applicants for
shelter who, in his judgment, may properly be received, plain and wholesome
food and lodging for a night, free of charge, and also to cause such applicants to
be bathed on admission and their clothing to be steamed and disinfected.
Id
143. Id (citing Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E.2d 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975)).
144. Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 54-55, 332 N.E.2d 303, 309-10, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422,
430-31 (1975).
145. Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 11, col. 5; see Hayes, supra note 20, at 81
(gratefully acknowledging that commentators tend to ignore the fact that the "entire legal
analysis buttressing the [Callahan] decision is contained in a single sentence in the footnotes").
146. These witnesses were employees at homeless shelters in New York City. Callahan,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 11, col. 5.
147. Id. New York City had theretofore created shelters that were tantamount to no
shelter at all because they were "less inviting than the subway system." Hayes, supra note 24,
at 6. In these shelters, homeless people suffered injuries to their health, safety, and dignity
each day. Id (discussing the testimony of a witness from the Catholic Worker, a private
charitable organization).
148. Hayes, supra note 24, at 6.
149. Final Judgment by Consent, Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979) (No. 42582/79), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INST., THE
RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 223 (1988) [hereinafter Callahan Consent Judgment].
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for each homeless man who applied for it as long as he met the eligi-
bility standards of the New York State home relief programs or was
in need of temporary shelter because of "physical, mental or social
dysfunction."'' 50 The consent decree also mandated that some mini-
mum standards of decency be maintained.15 1
In 1983, New York courts extended the right to emergency shel-
ter to homeless women in Eldredge v. Koch,' 52 and in 1984, to home-
less families with children in McCain v. Koch.' 53  In granting
summary judgment in favor of the homeless women plaintiffs, the
Eldredge trial court stated that the "contention [that women were
constitutionally entitled to treatment equal to that accorded to men]
is so obviously meritorious that it scarcely warrant[ed] discussion."' 54
The McCain trial court, applying a different line of reasoning with
respect to homeless families with children, granted a preliminary
injunction barring the denial of emergency shelter to eligible homeless
families and requiring the city to meet minimal standards of health
and safety.' 55 The McCain trial court's reasoning was based on the
assumption that the local government undertook the duty to provide
emergency shelter.' 56 Thus, the issue became "whether the shelter
provided should meet reasonable minimum standards."'5 7 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the
provision of shelter, and held that the courts have the power, "once
[local governments] under[take] to provide housing, to make that
shelter minimally habitable.' 15
8
150. Id. at 224-25.
151. Id. at 225-27; see Hayes, supra note 24, at 6. For example, the decree declared that
each bed in the shelter had to be at least 30 inches wide with a well-constructed mattress, a
clean pillow and pillow case, clean sheets, and a clean blanket. Callahan Consent Judgment,
supra note 149, at 225-26. The decree also provided for mail and laundry services, group
recreation, and storage facilities. Id. at 226-27.
152. 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct.), rev'don other grounds, 98 A.D.2d 675,
469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1983); see Hayes, supra note 24, at 7 n.5.
153. 127 Misc. 2d 20, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1984), modified, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502
N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div.), appeal granted, 503 N.Y.S.2d 997 (App. Div. 1986), later
proceeding, 68 N.Y.2d 713, 497 N.E.2d 679, 506 N.Y.S.2d 312, rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511
N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987).
154. Eldredge, 118 Misc. 2d at 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 961. The reversal of the summary
judgment was based on the necessity for further evidence on the issue of specific breaches; it
did not affect the trial court's legal reasoning. 98 A.D.2d at 675-76, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
155. McCain, 127 Misc. 2d at 25, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 988. The McCain intermediate appellate
court expressly applied the same line of analysis as in Eldredge to find a right to shelter for
homeless families with children. McCain, 117 A.D.2d at 214, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
156. McCain, 127 Misc. 2d at 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
157. Id. For a discussion on the proper scope of services, see infra notes 185-99 and
accompanying text.
158. McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 118, 511 N.E.2d 62, 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 922
(1987).
[Vol. 45:567
1990-1991] HOUSING FOR THE HOMELESS HIV-ILL
Arguably, because the Callahan court did not specify the extent
to which it relied on the New York Constitution, and because the final
judgment was in the form of a consent decree without final adjudica-
tion of any factual or legal issue, the New York Constitution alone
may not provide a right to shelter.'59 Interestingly, in McCain, the
intermediate appellate court found a probability of success on the
merits on the issue of a state constitutional right to shelter.160 The
Court of Appeals, however, never directly addressed the issue of
whether "plaintiffs are ... likely to 'prove that ... article XVII [of the
New York Constitution] substantively guarantees minimal physical
standards of cleanliness, warmth, space and rudimentary convenience
in emergency shelter.' 161 Nevertheless, in 1987, a supreme court of
New York County continued to recognize an "affirmative governmen-
tal obligation to provide aid to the needy," 1 62 including a governmen-
tal duty to provide emergency shelter to homeless families. 63
Although an argument based on a constitutional mandate might pre-
vail, the New York Constitution has been instrumental thus far only
when invoked in conjunction with state statutes or other constitu-
tional provisions.
Litigants also have been successful in a number of states other
than New York in establishing a right to shelter.' 64 For example,
advocates have pressed statutory claims in West Virginia,' 65 New
159. In fact, one commentator argues that the Callahan approach is limited to situations of
an emergency nature. Note, supra note 18, at 947. Thus, other jurisdictions may not similarly
interpret "general statutory language to imply an enforceable right to shelter." Id at 946.
160. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 214-15, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 730 (App. Div. 1986).
161. McCain, 70 N.Y.2d at 118, 511 N.E.2d at 65, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (quoting McCain,
117 A.D.2d at 217, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731).
162. Barnes v. Koch, 136 Misc. 2d 96, 100, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
163. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; and Palmer v. Cuomo, 121 A.D.2d 194, 503
N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1986)). Aid to the needy in New York is "not a matter of legislative
grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our constitution." Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7,
371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730 (1977). But see Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp.
1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see supra note 126.
164. Comment, supra note 31, at 239. For example, a consent decree was entered in
Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1985). The stated intent of the
decree was to provide necessary shelter and services for those "who are or will become
homeless." Consent Decree at 7, Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11,
1985). The decree defines homeless persons as "those without shelter, . . . or with inadequate
shelter such that a person cannot live in it without substantial risk to life, health and safety."
Id.; see also Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Resources, 400
Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603 (1987).
165. Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
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Jersey, 166 and California. 167 Moreover, at least fourteen states have
enacted legislation that arguably can support a right to emergency
shelter. 168
In Hodge v. Ginsberg, 9 West Virginia's highest state court held
that pursuant to the state's adult protective services statutes, 170 West
Virginia was required to provide food, shelter, and medical care to
indigent persons unable to carry on the daily activities needed to sus-
tain life and reasonable health. 17' "If [this] ... precedent is followed,
similar laws existing in several other states would support a right to
shelter for all homeless persons in those states,"' 17 or at least for seg-
ments of the homeless population.1 73  In those states having
mandatory protective services laws, "eligible segments of the home-
less population-generally, the aged and mentally incapacitated-
have a statutory right to shelter."1 74  Moreover, in those few states
where legislatures broadly defined eligibility to include those persons
who are not necessarily incapacitated, but merely unable to provide
shelter for themselves, a broad right to shelter for all homeless per-
sons may exist.' 75
New Jersey courts also have recognized a right to shelter under
the state's protective services laws 176 even though the New Jersey
166. Maticka v. Atlantic City, 216 N.J. Super. 434, 523 A.2d 416 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987). For a commentator's perspective on New York, West Virginia, and New Jersey claims,
see Note, supra note 20, at 283-84.
167. Hansen v. Department of Social Servs., 193 Cal. App. 3d 283, 238 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Ct.
App. 1987).
168. Note, supra note 20, at 284 & n.59. The use of state statutes, especially public health
laws, has the greatest potential for success in current litigation for the homeless HIV-ill.
Telephone interview with Virginia Shubert of the Coalition for the Homeless (Oct. 13, 1989).
169. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983). In a class action on behalf of homeless persons, "the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declared that under the Social Services for Adults
Act of 1981, the state was obligated to provide shelter, food, and medical care for its homeless
population." Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 328-29 (discussing the Hodge decision).
170. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 247 (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 9-6-1 to 9-6-8 (Cum. Supp. 1982)).
171. Id. at 251.
172. Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 328 (footnote omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 329. In light of the changing homeless population, the HIV-ill may be deemed
to be an eligible segment of the homeless population.
175. Id. at 329-30. Those opposed to judicial intervention advocate narrower
interpretations of statutory language. McKittrick, supra note 31, at 409-10. The West
Virginia Legislature subsequently solidified the Hodge decision by amending the statute to
provide that the department "shall," rather than "may," develop an assistance plan. Id. at 409
(citing W. VA. CODE § 9-6-7 (1990)).
176. See, e.g., Maticka v. Atlantic City, 216 N.J. Super. 434, 524 A.2d 416 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987)). In Maticka, the court emphasized the stated purposes of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44:10-1 to 44:10-18 (West 1982), which are:
(1) To provide for the care of eligible dependent children in their own homes or
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Constitution does not guarantee a right to emergency shelter. 177
These laws are designed to provide emergency care and services to
incapacitated adults deemed unable to protect themselves from abuse
or neglect.17 8  Protective services statutes generally include shelter
and other basic necessities.1 79
Finally, in Hansen v. Department of Social Services, 'I taxpayers
on behalf of homeless families challenged the compliance of the Cali-
fornia Department of Social Services ("DSS") with state statutes.181
The plaintiffs in this consolidated action sought to compel DSS to
provide families who are homeless, or who are imminently threatened
with homelessness, with emergency shelter, child welfare services, or
other assistance.18 2 In support of its existing policy, under which DSS
did not assist homeless families to obtain housing, DSS argued that
"it is the intent of the Legislature that 'emergency shelter care,' as
mentioned in section 16504.1, be solely provided to a neglected or
abused child during the period that the child is initially removed from
his or her home for the purpose of evaluating the need for state inter-
vention and protection.""8 3 The court, however, inter alia, enjoined
DSS from defining emergency shelter care so restrictively as to
"exclude homeless children, regardless of whether homeless children
remain with their parent(s), guardian(s), or caretaker(s)" to further
in the homes of relatives, under standards and conditions compatible with
decency and health,
(2) To help maintain and strengthen family life,
(3) To help such parents or relatives to attain the maximum self-support and
personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection, and
(4) To provide for the care of a dependent child whose parents have been denied
assistance under the provisions of section 2.
Id § 44:10-1(a) (footnote omitted).
177. Maticka, 216 N.J. Super. at 442, 524 A.2d at 420; see Langdon & Kass, supra note 18,
at 306.
178. Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 327.
179. Id at 328.
180. 193 Cal. App. 3d 283, 238 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Ct. App. 1987).
181. Id. at 286-87, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 234. The state statute primarily at issue, known as the
Child Welfare Act, requires "emergency shelter care" to be provided for children who are: (1)
still with their families and can remain safely with them, CAL. WELF. & INST. § 16501.1 (West
1982); (2) in need of temporary foster care, id. § 16501.2; and (3) in need of "an alternative
permanent family structure ... because of abuse, neglect, or exploitation [and] cannot safely
remain at home and who are unlikely ever to return home," id. § 16501.3.
182. Hansen, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 286-87, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
183. Id at 290, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 236. Thus, "homeless children [were] eligible to receive
emergency shelter care, provided that such children have been, or are in the process of being,
removed from their homes." Id Plaintiffs, however, contended that emergency shelter care
shall be accorded a broad meaning and shall be provided to all homeless children, whether or
not separated from their families. Id. at 290-91, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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the California legislature's policy to meet the housing needs of low-
income families." 4 Thus, this was a victory in the establishment of a
right to emergency shelter for all people within the state of California.
B. The Scope of the Right and the Corresponding Duty
Whether the right to shelter is premised on state constitutions or
statutes, the shelter provided must meet certain minimum standards
of habitability. As provided in McCain v. Koch,"8 5 under the well-
established duty of undertaking, once a city undertakes to provide
emergency housing, it is obligated to preserve certain minimum stan-
dards of sanitation, safety, and decency. 18 6 "In a civilized society a
'shelter' which does not meet minimal standards of cleanliness,
warmth, space and rudimentary conveniences is no shelter at all. '' 187
Providing uninhabitable shelter, then, is tantamount to improperly
denying relief to the homeless.'
In addition to McCain, two other New York cases provide a
basis for arguing that once a city undertakes to provide shelter, it
must evaluate the needs or health risks of the homeless individuals
when determining the type of shelter to provide. For example, in
Barnes v. Koch, 18 9 the plaintiffs sought to relocate homeless families
residing in a public shelter and to restrain further placement in the
shelter. 190 "High concentrations of lead in chipping and falling lead
paint" 19' presented immediate health threats to the residents, espe-
cially those with young children.192 A New York trial court acknowl-
edged its lack of power to determine minimum standards of comfort,
but utilized its equitable power to enforce minimum standards of hab-
184. Id. at 298, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 242. The court reviewed related state and federal statutes
and interpretive caselaw regarding the provision of emergency shelter to children to
demonstrate the well-established legislative interest in providing such shelter to homeless
families. Id. at 295-96, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
185. 70 N.Y.2d 109, 119, 511 N.E.2d 62, 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923 (1987).
186. Id. The New York Court of Appeals cited the list of minimum standard provisions
provided in the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction to homeless families with
children and compelling defendants to provide adequate emergency housing. Id. at 115, 511
N.E.2d at 63-64, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The Court of Appeals emphasized that "the substance
of the minimum standards in the injunction was [subsequently] included in more rigorous
departmental regulations for hotels and motels used for emergency housing promulgated by
the Commissioner of Social Services." Id. Hence, this is an illustration of litigation positively
affecting legislation.
187. McCain, 127 Misc. 2d at 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
188. McCain, 70 N.Y.2d at 120, 511 N.E.2d at 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (citing Tucker v.
Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977)).
189. 136 Misc. 2d 96, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
190. Id. at 97, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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itability recognized by the Court of Appeals in McCain.'93  It
surmised that the right to shelter was an entitlement that included
"the right to be sheltered free of potentially significant health
threats"'194 because "implicit in the term shelter is a requirement that
the individuals involved not be placed in a situation directly threaten-
ing to their health."' 95 Thus, this decision supports the proposition
that when a governmental entity undertakes to provide shelter, it
must evaluate the needs of the individual inhabitants.
Similarly, in Slade v. Koch, 196 the plaintiffs were homeless fami-
lies with special medical needs, including "pregnant women, families
with children under six months of age, and families whose members
ha[d] physical, psychological or medical conditions."'' 97 At issue was
the governmental entity's compliance with provisions of New York's
Family Shelter regulations. 98 The court granted preliminary relief,
noting that the "placement of tiny babies and pregnant mothers in
mass shelters w[ould] cause irreparable harm."' 99 Consequently, the
outcome of this case implies that courts must take into consideration
193. Id. at 100, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (citing McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d
62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987), rev'g, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 1986)).
194. Id. at 101, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
195. Id. at 100, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
196. 135 Misc. 2d 283, 514 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 136 Misc. 2d 119, 517
N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (The trial court originally issued an injunction against New
York City, and subsequently modified it to include the state.).
197. Id. at 284, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
198. Id. at 284 & n.2, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 848 & n.2. Section 900.6(d) of the New York Code
states: "The only shelter for families to which a family including a pregnant woman or an
infant under six months old may be referred by a local social services district is a Tier II
facility .... ." 18 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 900.6(d) (1988). A Tier II facility,
pursuant to section 900.2(b), is a congregate shelter that provides private sleeping
accommodations for individual families, meals, and additional services. Id. § 900.2(b). A Tier
I facility is a barracks-style shelter with open sleeping areas, meals, and some services. Id.
Section 900.6(e) states: "The only shelter for families to which a family including a member
having a medical, physical or other special need which cannot be adequately served in a Tier I
facility may be referred is a Tier II facility .... " Id. § 900.6(e). Section 900.6(f) states:
A district shall not refer to a Tier I or II facility a family containing a member
who: (1) has a mental or physical condition that makes such placement
inappropriate or otherwise may cause danger to him/herself or others; (2) is
likely to substantially interfere with the health, safety, welfare or care of other
residents; (3) is in need of a level of medical, mental health, nursing care or other
assistance that cannot be rendered safely and effectively by the facility, or that
cannot be reasonably provided by the facility through the assistance of other
community resources; or (4) has a generalized systemic communicable disease or
a readily communicable local infection which cannot be properly isolated and
quarantined in the facility.
Id. § 900.6(f).
199. Slade, 135 Misc. 2d at 290, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 852. In the instant case, after having been
placed in Tier I shelters, two infants contracted severe diarrhea, one child was unable to
receive her regular physical therapy and suffered asthma attacks and an ear infection, and one
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the special medical needs of homeless families when placing them in
shelters.
It is possible that every jurisdiction currently contains an appro-
priate statute on which to base a right to shelter. Creative advocates
seeking to discover a path to shelter must diligently examine their
state statutes and administrative regulations when representing a
homeless client in need of extensive services. Once the right to shelter
is established, the duty of undertaking analysis can be employed to
require the governmental entity to evaluate the special medical needs
of the homeless individuals so that medically-appropriate housing can
be provided to the homeless HIV-ill.
C. Mixon v. Grinker: When HIV and Homelessness
Come Together
Case law and common sense demonstrate that housing endanger-
ing the life of a resident is tantamount to a complete denial of shel-
ter.2"° A claim based on such an argument would be a denial-of-
benefits claim.20 The threshold goal of the advocate for the homeless
HIV-ill should be the provision of medically-appropriate housing
that, at the very least, does not provide a vehicle for further threaten-
ing the lives or health of its inhabitants.20 2
In Mixon v. Grinker,2 °3 the plaintiffs were three homeless individ-
uals who displayed symptoms of HIV-infection. 2 4 They sought a
judgment determining that the City of New York was required to pro-
vide them and all others similarly situated" 'with medically appropri-
ate housing which include[d], at a minimum, a private sleeping area
and sanitary facilities.' "205 They also sought a declaratory judgment
that the existing barracks-style shelters were medically inappropriate
and unlawful. 20 6 The plaintiffs argued that the city had a duty to pro-
vide all homeless persons with housing placements which were appro-
priate to their needs and medical conditions, and that the city had
violated this duty by relegating the plaintiffs to the municipal shelter
pregnant woman "suffered a miscarriage, unattended, on the floor of the communal
bathroom." Id. at 286-87, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
200. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. This characterization will help to
overcome justiciability obstacles and gain access to judicial review.
202. Eg., Barnes v. Koch, 136 Misc. 2d 96, 100, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
203. No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 157
A.D.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1990).
204. Mixon, slip op. at 1-2.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Complaint, supra note 40, at para. 5.
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system and the streets. 20 7
The court granted a preliminary injunction, 208 accepting the
incremental argument that once the city became a provider of emer-
gency shelter,209 it was required to make the shelter minimally habita-
ble.2"' Because habitability requires the substantial freedom from
potentially significant health threats,2 1  an HIV-ill person's sup-
pressed immune system makes the exposure to people with infectious
diseases life-threatening, and, hence, such a living environment is
uninhabitable. 212 Thus, in light of an HIV-ill person's specific health
needs, life in ordinary shelters does not satisfy the test of minimum
habitability.
The court extended protection to HIV-infected individuals in
part because the stated policies of New York City already provided
for assistance to individuals with CDC-defined AIDS213 by providing
housing units or granting rent subsidies, as opposed to placing them
in shelters.21 4  With regard to medically-appropriate housing, there
was "no reason for a distinction between CDC defined AIDS and
other HIV related illnesses. 215
207. Memorandum of Law, supra note 61, at 2.
208. Mixon, slip op. at 7 (pending trial). For a preliminary injunction, three requirements
must be met: " '1) the likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable injury absent granting
the preliminary injunction; and 3) a balancing of the equities.' "Id at 6 (quoting W.T. Grant
Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 517, 420 N.E.2d 953, 963, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761, 771 (1981)). Thus,
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are suffering continuing and irreparable injury by
being forced to live under conditions which pose a threat to their health and safety. An HIV-
infected individual placed in a barracks-style shelter satisfied this requirement. Id. at 7.
209. In granting the preliminary injunction, the court stated:
The obligation of the City to provide shelter to the homeless emanates from the
consent decree dated August 26, 1981 in the case of Callahan v. Carey (N.Y. Co.
Index No. 42582/79), in which the City agreed to provide emergency shelter to
homeless men. In Eldredge v. Koch, 98 A.D.2d 675 (1st Dep't 1983), the
obligation was extended to women.... and finally in McCain v. Koch, supra, the
right to emergency housing for families was recognized.
Mixon, slip op. at 6; see supra notes 133-58 and accompanying text.
210. Mixon, slip op. at 6.
211. Id. at 7.
212. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
213. The CDC sets criteria for diagnosing AIDS. In 1987, for example, the diagnostic
criteria were:
(1) a positive blood test for serum antibody to the virus that causes AIDS or a
positive cell culture for the virus; (2) a low number of T-helper white blood cells
and a low ratio of T-helper white blood cells to T-suppressor white blood cells;
and (3) the presence of one or more opportunistic infections that are indicative of
underlying cellular immunodeficiency.
Green, supra note 47, at 30.
214. Mixon, slip op. at 3.
215. Id. at 5. Note that this concept is consistent with the use of the term "PWA" to
incorporate all symptomatic HIV-ill people. See supra note 16.
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Mixon resulted in further disputes among the City of New York,
state officials, and attorneys for the plaintiffs regarding compliance
with the court's order.21 6 The city continued to propose shelters as
the best available housing, while the state criticized the proposals,
arguing that if the city developed special sections in existing shelters,
a permanent lack of good institutional care would result.217 State offi-
cials, like the plaintiffs' attorneys, advocate housing for the homeless
HIV-ill in private or double rooms in specially-designed residences. 218
Specifically, the plaintiffs' attorneys argued that the city's plan failed
to meet the demands of the preliminary ruling in the Mixon case by,
inter alia, making available "private, non-congregate housing.., only
to symptomatic HIV-infected persons who are so severely ill as to
require assistance with bathing or toileting, ' 21 9 by segregating PWA's
from other residents in existing shelters, which constitutes a "setting
obviously lacking in the privacy needed to ward off infection," 22 and
by relegating all other HIV-ill individuals to "the City's barrack
shelters."'22
Mixon illustrates that although a policy change might establish a
legal right to safe housing, it does not necessarily ensure the provision
and availability of safe housing. In sum, Mixon was a result of a
unique combination of factors. Unlike many other jurisdictions, New
York already had policies and administrative directives to provide for
housing for PWA's, although even that housing was not always ade-
quate or available.22 2 Critics may argue that judicial extensions of the
policies, as in Mixon, will act as a disincentive to governments in
establishing similar threshold policies for fear of having to comply
with more than they initially contemplated. HIV-illness, however, is
216. See, e.g., Rimer, Koch's Plan to House AIDS Patients Stalls, N.Y. Times, June 15,
1989, at B13, col. 3; Letter from Virginia Shubert, of Coalition for the Homeless, Attorney for
Plaintiffs, and Nan Hunter, of American Civil Liberties Union, Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Intervenor, to Rosemary Myers, Assistant Corporation Counsel for New York City (Mar. 17,
1989) (complaining that the city's interim plan to house PWA's is "unacceptably vague and
standardless").
217. Rimer, supra note 216, at B13, col. 3 (discussing statements by a New York State
Department of Social Services official).
218. Id. In fact, the representatives of the state agencies were "very surprised and
concerned to discover" that the city's plan was presented to the Mixon court and was publicly
announced despite the ongoing discussions that had been pending between the State
Department of Social Services, the State Department of Health and the New York City
Human Resources Administration to develop a joint city and state plan. Letter from Lisa Kill,
Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York, to Justice Lehner, who presided over
the Mixon case (May 17, 1989).
219. Letter from Virginia Shubert to Justice Lehner (May 25, 1989).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See generally Cheuvront, supra note 17.
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so prevalent that very soon every jurisdiction will likely have special
provisions for HIV-related circumstances. 223 As these special provi-
sions are enacted, advocates should use the developments in New
York as guiding tools in an attempt to respond to the crisis of the
homeless HIV-ill.
V. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE ARGUMENT
A. Establishing the Right
Section IV examined the "right to shelter" cases to explore the
probability of a jurisdiction's recognition of a right to emergency or
permanent shelter. Once established, the right to shelter could legally
and logically be defined to include housing that is medically-appropri-
ate to an individual's needs. 224 Nonetheless, many jurisdictions have
not established a right to shelter for all homeless people. In jurisdic-
tions where there is little likelihood of successfully using state laws to
establish a right to shelter, an alternative route to the provision of
housing for indigent HIV-ill people must be created. A parallel, yet
unorthodox argument, is that where a right to health care exists, 225
housing is necessary to give substance to the right. Indeed, many
recipients do not benefit from the health care to which they are enti-
tled because they cannot even follow the most basic medical remedies
226,
of bed rest and regular periodic consumption of medicine. In sum,
as part of the proper provision of health care, some type of housing is
needed. 227
Ideally, indigent Americans should be able to obtain necessary
medical treatment without suffering from discrimination based on an
inability to pay for services. 228 Historically, state governments have
borne the responsibility for furnishing necessary medical care to their
223. See Chackes, supra note 24, at 112 n.105.
224. See, e.g., Mixon v. Grinker, No. 14932/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1989), aff'd and
modified on other grounds, 157 A.D.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1990).
225. Almost all states have constitutional or statutory provisions that authorize or mandate
governmental entities to furnish some medical care for indigents. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW
PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 5.
226. Members of the HIV-ill population often have to take zidovudine ("AZT") six times a
day. Rosenthal, supra note 71, at B9, col. 4 (noting Dr. O'Connell's belief that taking AZT as
prescribed is almost impossible for the homeless). A typical homeless person does not have a
place to store AZT and does not have a timepiece to measure intervals between consumption.
227. An alternative, cost-reducing form of medical care, requiring stability in housing, is
suggested at infra notes 326-39 and accompanying text.
228. Public opinion supports this notion. Poll Finds Reagan Support Down but Democrats
Still Lacking Fire, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, at Al, col. 5, B24, cols. 2-3 ("Americans say that
the Government should guarantee medical care to everyone.").
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indigent residents.229 In recent years, the federal government has
assumed much of this responsibility through the Medicaid 23 ' and
231 232Medicare programs. However, these federal programs do not
address many health care needs; thus, state and local governments
remain instrumental in providing medical care to the poor.233 In fact,
almost all states have constitutional or statutory provisions that
authorize or mandate governmental entities to furnish medical care
for indigents.2 34 The classification scheme of medical assistance varies
by jurisdiction.235
229. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 3.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988). Eligibility requirements for participation in Medicaid
programs are based on categorical, income, and asset requirements which vary from state to
state. Makadon, Seage, Thorpe & Fineberg, Paying the Medical Cost of the HIV Epidemic: A
Review of Policy Options, 3 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 123, 125 (1990)
[hereinafter Makadon]. The general categories include "families with dependent children, the
aged, the blind, the disabled, and in some states the 'medically needy.'" Id.
231. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26, 42 & 45 U.S.C.). For Medicare eligibility, there are no
income or asset requirements; however, previous contribution to the Social Security system is
necessary. Makadon, supra note 230, at 126. The categories include "the elderly, the disabled,
and those with end-stage renal disease." Id. Furthermore, the Medicare program "requires
that individuals be disabled for 24 months after a 5-month waiting period before being able to
receive benefits." Id. (citing R. FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS 72 (1986)).
232. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 3.
233. Id. at 3-4. Many health care providers have refused to participate in Medicaid because
of "low payment levels and limitations in the extent of services covered." Makadon, supra
note 230, at 126. The HIV-ill, in particular, suffer from lack of coverage in states in which
Medicaid still does not pay for AZT, one of the few effective antiviral drugs available in the
United States for the HIV-infected. Id. Moreover, although people with CDC-defined AIDS
are considered presumptively disabled for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, id. at 125, the HIV-
infected who do not meet that definition are not eligible for Medicaid based on their
seropositive state. Id. The Medicare program utilizes the same definition for disability.
However, its two-year waiting period has kept all but two per cent of the PWA's out of the
program. Id. at 126. To date, the life expectancy of an individual with an AIDS diagnosis has
been less than two years. Id.
234. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 5. All states, except Kentucky
and Tennessee, have health care programs for indigents. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR
LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Health Benefits: How the System Is Responding to AIDS, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 724, 734 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE].
235. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 8. Generally, state and local
medical assistance programs can be separated into six categories for classification: (1) general
assistance/general relief ("GA" or "GR") programs; (2) state and/or county medical
assistance programs; (3) specialized disease treatment programs; (4) public hospitals; (5)
catastrophic illness programs; and (6) public health departments. Id. at 8-10.
In GA programs, "medical assistance is provided as an adjunct to cash assistance
payments." Id. at 8. Recipients must meet eligibility requirements. Id. At least 39 states
employ such a system. Id. "The scope of services provided varies widely, and ... is [often]
limited to emergency medical care or public hospitals." Id. Courts have interpreted GA
provisions to require a "minimum threshold of medical care." Id.
Medical assistance programs at the state and/or county level are similar to GA or GR
programs. Id. However, they are not administered as an adjunct to cash assistance programs.
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The unique characteristics of HIV-illness make it difficult to
accept approaches taken by governmental entities to combat other
communicable diseases.236 Although humanity has dealt with various
"plagues, '237 never has humanity dealt with a fatal, selectively trans-
missible disease. In the past, governmental entities have utilized pub-
lic health laws to protect society by quarantining contagious
individuals; moreover, mental health laws have also caused many
individuals to be involuntarily confined. 238  Thus, although both pub-
lic and mental health laws may provide a form of housing for the
affected individuals, neither approach adequately serves the needs of
the homeless HIV-ill.
239
1. PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS: CONTROLLING COMMUNICABLE
DISEASES
Legislatures traditionally have enacted public health laws to pro-
Id. The scope of medical assistance programs varies widely, but these programs are usually
more inclusive than GA or GR programs. Id.
Specialized disease treatment programs usually address specific illnesses of public
concern. Id. at 9. These illnesses include "tuberculosis, mental illness, alcoholism and drug
abuse, kidney disease, cancer or hemophilia." Id. HIV-illness arguably belongs in this
category.
Traditionally, public hospitals were "the primary providers of hospitalization for the poor
and uninsured." Id. This mode of care is appropriate when the HIV-il need to be
hospitalized; however, many seropositive individuals do not require hospitalization, but need
to be in a safe, infection-free environment to prevent the deterioration of their health.
Drapkin, supra note 44, at 93 ("Once a homeless person acquires HIV infection, the
development of AIDS is likely to be accelerated by malnutrition and the repeated infections he
or she is prone to acquire .... "). These individuals are not benefitted by public hospitals until
their conditions become acute, and between relapses, the HIV-ill may not even require hospital
care. Lambert, supra note 57, at E6, col. 1.
In a catastrophic illness program, coverage typically begins after medical expenses exceed
a certain threshold. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 234, at 734-35. The average
HIV-ill person easily exceeds such thresholds, and, thus, "[c]ost-sharing requirements may...
prove burdensome." Id. at 735.
Similar to specialized disease treatment programs, public health departments provide care
to people suffering from illnesses that threaten public health or safety. NATIONAL HEALTH
LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 10. Often, the recipients of this type of "aid" are
stigmatized and treated as outcasts. Moreover, the scope of these services traditionally does
not extend as far as housing.
236. Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIC 47 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987); Sullivan & Field, AIDS and the Coercive
Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139, 142 (1988). But see Benjamin, supra note
45, at 415-16 (The health care delivery system in the United States has an established approach
for dealing with the dangers of infectious diseases, generally, and new solutions may not
necessarily be needed for HIV-related problems.).
237. See S. SONTAG, supra note 52, at 44-71.
238. Grad, Communicable Disease and Mental Health: Restrictions of the Person, 12 AM.
J.L. & MED. 381, 395 (1986) (abstract).
239. See infra notes 240-60 & 279-301.
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tect the public health by exerting control over human conduct, not to
aid the indigent sick.2" The oldest field of public health law is the
control of communicable diseases,241 and these laws have been
authorized by the states' police powers,2 42 subject to constitutional
limitations.243 Generally, "[w]hen a public health officer has proper
grounds to believe that a particular person suffers from or [carries] a
communicable disease, the officer is authorized to [act]." 2' The
officer may "issue an order requiring the person to submit to a medi-
cal examination"2 45 to determine whether isolation, detention in a
hospital, or some other action, is warranted. 2" "[C]ourts require that
the statutory authority for compulsory examination bear a reasonable
relationship to the public health purpose to be advanced"2 47 in order
to protect individual rights. In light of contemporary attitudes and
the stigmatization of the HIV-ill in general, however, compulsory
HIV testing is an especially sensitive subject.248
Because HIV-infection is unique, special concerns regarding pub-
lic health laws arise. For example, "the use of usual regulatory meas-
ures has become enmeshed with the issue of privacy relating to sexual
preference. "249 Moreover, as one commentator concludes,
"[tiraditional methods of identifying cases and carriers and detaining
them until no longer infectious are inapplicable to AIDS because
there is neither a cure nor an immunizing agent, and because the cases
are so numerous."
250
A common suggestion for dealing with the AIDS crisis is for
state governments to utilize their status as protector of the public
health to isolate or quarantine all HIV carriers.251 The laws of all fifty
states "still authorize quarantine for a large number of common com-
240. Grad, supra note 238, at 381. Measures to prevent the spread of contagion and to
prevent and control epidemics are within the province of these laws. Id. at 383, 391.
241. Id. at 381.
242. Gostin, supra note 236, at 48-49 (citing 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 432-433
(1979) (defining police power as "the power reserved to the states in the Constitution to take
necessary action to promote the public health and welfare, to foster prosperity, and to
maintain public order").
243. Id.
244. Grad, supra note 238, at 384.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. (citing Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 558, 561 (D.C. 1944)).
248. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621, 1624
(1989). Privacy and confidentiality issues add to the sensitivity of this subject matter.
249. Grad, supra note 238, at 394.
250. Id. As a result, "public health authorities can do little more than rely on public
education" to learn how to identify and treat the HIV-ill. Id. For a brief description of the
emphasis of this education, see id. at 394 n.77.
251. Sullivan & Field, supra note 236, at 139.
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municable diseases," '252 although these archaic laws do not generally
represent contemporary attitudes toward epidemiological control.253
Usually, when quarantined, a patient is completely restricted "to the
apartment or house where he or she is being cared for." '254 For the
homeless, the likely result is involuntary institutionalization in a hos-
pital or shelter. Admittedly, this is a form of housing. However, this
form of housing's overall negative effects--expense, probability of
contagion from other residents who have common infectious ail-
ments, stigmatization, and lack of privacy--outweigh any of its posi-
tive aspects in creating medically-appropriate shelters for the HIV-ill
homeless. Today, although health officers "may impose quarantine
on the basis of [their] reasonable belief that the person quarantined is
infected with a contagious disease,"255 contemporary legislation calls
for lesser restrictions than traditional quarantine. Thus, health
officers are more likely to impose compulsory hospitalization and
detention, instead of the more draconian quarantine.2 56
Although no state has seriously proposed general isolation poli-
cies to control HIV transmission, many states have enacted "behav-
ior-based isolation statutes that authorize restrictions of liberty on
'recalcitrant[s].' "257 When persons are aware that they are HIV-posi-
tive, but continue to engage in activities likely to transmit the virus,
some states expressly authorize isolation for these people because they
pose a serious threat to the public health.25 8 Many commentators
have discussed the constitutionality of restrictive measures regulating
the HIV-il1259 and have concluded that isolation measures will not
solve any problems, including the spread of the disease.26
252. Grad, supra note 238, at 387 (citing the statutory provisions of several states).
253. Id. at 381. AIDS is already a reportable communicable disease according to every
state. Id. at 383.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 388 (citing Ex parte King, 128 Cal. App. 27, 16 P.2d 694 (Ct. App. 1932); and
State v. Rackowski, 86 Conn. 677, 86 A. 606 (1913)). There are few recent cases on the subject
of quarantine. Id. at 388-89.
256. Id. at 389.
257. Gostin, supra note 248, at 1626.
258. Id.
259. E.g., Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986) (adopting a new analysis for the equal protection clause, and
arguing that many proposed public health regulations violate this clause); Note, The
Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986) (concluding that the
legislative threat of imposing severe restrictions on the personal freedom of AIDS carriers
poses both practical and legal dangers).
260. Gostin, supra note 236, at 65. See generally Sullivan & Field, supra note 236.
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2. PROPER DISCHARGE PLANNING
A fear of advocates for the homeless HIV-ill is that many HIV-ill
individuals will be hospitalized pursuant to emergency care statutes
and released without planned follow-up care or adequate facilities
when their conditions become less acute and no longer warrant emer-
gency status.2 61 Essentially, these individuals will be deinstitutional-
ized or released without any discharge planning. Discharge planning
is a "process for identifying and planning for the post-hospital care
needs of ... patients. 2 62  Generally, few states have explicit provi-
sions for post-discharge care and treatment for all people, but states
have enacted laws specifically providing for varying degrees of contin-
uing post-discharge governmental responsibility for the mentally
ill.2 6 3
Professionals in the HIV-care sector have begun to encourage the
development of proper discharge planning to ensure the best use of
nonhospital services and to reduce the length of hospital stays for the
HIV-ill.264 Upon discharge from a hospital in a weakened state, an
HIV-ill individual may need nutritional counseling, housekeeping
help, social services, and more sophisticated medical care.265 Unfor-
tunately, very few hospitals maintain proper discharge planning at
261. In Chicago, for example, hospitals discharge the homeless non-acute HIV-ill because
they cannot afford to keep them. Traska, Alternate Care: No Home Means No Home Care for
AIDS Patients, HOSPITALS, Jan. 5, 1986, at 69. At the other extreme, the HIV-ill who are not
in immediate need of prolonged hospitalization have not been released when they lacked a
home for after-hospital care. For example, in some cases, the homeless HIV-ill have been left
in acute care hospital beds for more than 14 months. Id. This not only creates enormous
medical costs, but intensifies their isolation as well.
262. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, Discharge Planning: Promises and
Realities, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 480, 480 (1988).
263. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 100.15 (Smith-Hurd 1990) (The statute
describes in detail the evaluation process of a potential dischargee and the subsequent
allowable placements in the community.); id. para. 100.15d ("Before any person is released
from [a Department facility], the chief administrative officer of the facility shall assess such
person's need for subsistence benefits and services including food, shelter, clothing and medical
care. If a determination is made that a person will be unable to meet such subsistence needs
after discharge, the chief administrative officer shall arrange for filing applications under
appropriate benefits programs, unless the person expressly declines."); id. para. 100.16 (For
conditionally discharged patients, the Department shall provide an after care program in
which a qualified person visits or consults with the recipient and the recipient's family every
six months after discharge to "advise the family of and determine the existence of the care and
occupation most favorable for the recipient's continued improvement and return to the
maintenance of mental health.").
264. Traska, Proper AIDS Care Demands Better Discharge Planning, HOSPITALS, Jan. 5,
1986, at 70.
265. Id. Hospitals often discharge the HIV-ill because their facilities allegedly cannot
afford to keep them. Traska, supra note 261, at 69.
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this time.266 Recently, however, some jurisdictions have realized the
benefits of proper discharge planning and have passed laws explicitly
governing the rights of patients to follow-up care upon release from
hospitals and nursing homes.2 67
Legislative reform has begun at both the federal and state levels.
At the federal level, under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1986,268 Medicare patients are entitled to a timely discharge planning
evaluation that focuses on a patient's probable need for appropriate
post-hospital services. 269 A hospital must arrange for the develop-
ment and initial implementation of a discharge plan upon the request
of a patient's physician.270 Hospitals must comply with the discharge
planning process requirements as a condition of participation in the
Medicare program.271 Although most AIDS patients do not rely on
Medicare funds because of the two-year eligibility requirement,27 2 the
discharge planning concept has been expanding beyond the Medicare
program. At the state level,27 3 some states have mandated discharge
planning requirements for all hospital patients, regardless of their
Medicare eligibility.274 Other states' general health and welfare codes
contain provisions enabling them to require discharge plans.275
Although existing federal and state laws can serve as a basis for
implementing discharge planning, and, possibly, provide a basis for
266. Traska, supra note 264, at 70 (quoting Cliff Morrison, San Francisco General
Hospital's assistant director of nursing and AIDS coordinator).
267. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-116 (1990) (The residents of long-term care facilities shall be
assisted "in finding a reasonably appropriate alternative placement prior to the proposed
transfer or discharge. The plan for such transfer or discharge shall be designed to mitigate the
effects of transfer stress to the resident."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 147.09 (Smith-
Hurd 1990) (Whenever a Medicare patient is hospitalized, "the patient shall be notified of
discharge at least 24 hours prior to discharge from the hospital" and "shall receive written
information on the patient's right to appeal the discharge pursuant to the federal Medicare
program."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21773(9) (West 1980) ("The patient shall receive
counseling services before and after the [involuntary] transfer [from a nursing home] to
minimize the possible adverse effect of the transfer."); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10,
§ 405.220) (1987) (This section provides for rights to follow-up care for all patients.); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.192 (Vernon 1991) ("The health authority or
department, in consultation with the person, shall prepare a continuing care plan for a person
who is scheduled to be discharged if the person requires continuing care.").
268. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9305(c)(l)-(2), 100 Stat. 1989 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x
(1988)).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(6) (1988); NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra
note 262, at 480 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(6)).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(ee)(2)(B).
271. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 262, at 484.
272. See supra note 231.
273. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 262, at 486.
274. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.220) (1987).
275. For a compilation of relevant statutes, see NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW
CENTER, supra note 262, at 486 n.92.
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medically-appropriate housing for the homeless HIV-ill, more explicit
legislation, or regulations issued pursuant to existing legislation,
would better meet the specific needs of the HIV-ill. If adequate serv-
ices and funding are not available, however, authorities can do very
little to enforce a statute.276 Absent community-based resources, such
as "skilled nursing facility beds, ' 277 no amount of federal or state leg-
islation will make discharge planning a reality.278
3. MENTAL HEALTH LAWS: INTERPRETING EXISTING
LEGISLATION
Mental health is a newer legal field than communicable disease
law. It attempts to balance an individual's right to be free from undue
restrictions, 279 "society's right to protect itself from persons who may
endanger others, and society's obligation to care for those unable to
care for themselves. ' 28 ° These same concerns apply to the homeless
HIV-ill, and mental health laws may be an additional tool in the
advocate's arsenal to secure medically-appropriate housing for the
homeless HIV-ill.
Mental health care advocates have begun recently to apply
mental health legislation to the homeless because a large proportion
of this population is mentally ill.28 1 This societal problem resulted
partly from the "massive deinstitutionalization 282 movement, where
for three decades, mental hospitals discharged mentally ill people at a
rapid rate. 28 3 Mental health care reformers, like HIV-ill care reform-
ers, believed that treatment in the community would be more effective
276. Id. at 482.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 482-84 (discussing problems already encountered by discharge planners assisting
Medicare patients).
279. Grad, supra note 238, at 382.
280. Id.
281. E.g., Comment, supra note 113, at 197. An estimated "33% to 50% of the
approximately 2 million homeless are . . . mentally ill." Id. at 198 (discussing various
numerical estimates of the homeless population).
As with the rights of the HIV-ill, only a few state constitutions provide rights for the
mentally ill. Note, supra note 21, at 1158. There is no constitutional right to treatment,
although, arguably, involuntary commitment without treatment violates substantive due
process. See Comment, supra note 113, at 203-04 (discussing Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (relying unsuccessfully on parens patriae theory and quid pro quo
theory), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)). In Donaldson, the United States Supreme Court
refused to address the constitutionality of the right to treatment. See Donaldson v. O'Connor,
422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
282. Comment, supra note 113, at 199.
283. Id. at 199-201; see Note, supra note 21, at 1155-58. From 1955 to 1980, "the number
of patients in state mental hospitals dropped from 559,000 to 132,000." Id. at 1156.
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than treatment in the dehumanizing conditions of institutions.2 4
Deinstitutionalization was intended to achieve the two similar, but
independent, goals of decreasing inpatient populations, while increas-
ing provision of mental health care in the community.28 5
Deinstitutionalization failed in the mental health care context.
The emerging crisis of the growing number of the homeless HIV-ill
provides parallels to the deinstitutionalization movement in that
housing and community care are desperately needed. Those involved
in the care of the HIV-ill, therefore, should make a conscious attempt
to learn from the failure of deinstitutionalization so that proper plan-
ning and legislation will provide necessary resources, housing, and
community services before the crisis reaches epidemic proportions.286
The primary reasons for deinstitutionalization's failure were the
lack of adequate community facilities, 28 7 "the lack of a central 'deliv-
ery system' of services for the mentally ill," 2 8 and the "lack of plan-
ning for such fundamental resources as structured living
arrangements and adequate treatment and rehabilitative facilities in
the community. ' 28 9 Because deinstitutionalization was not an articu-
lated goal in the beginning, governmental entities did not plan in
advance for adequate facilities upon patient release. Moreover, states
and communities resisted community mental health centers and were
284. Comment, supra note 113, at 198-99. Mental health institutions are analogous to
public shelters for the homeless.
285. Note, supra note 21, at 1156 (citing Kanter, A Brief History of Deinstitutionalization, in
PROTECTION & ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELED MENTALLY ILL 79 (Mental
Health Law Project ed. 1987)).
286. AIDS is a disease of epidemic proportions. Gostin, supra note 236, at 47; Sullivan &
Field, supra note 236, at 140. The success of society's long-term approach to this situation
depends upon the response of governmental officials at this crucial, early stage in the
development of AIDS law. Analogizing the AIDS crisis to the pattern observed with the
mentally ill shows that it makes sense to save time, money, and lives, by passing legislation to
provide for appropriate community resources, housing, and supportive services before a crisis
situation reaches the point of no return.
287. Comment, supra note 113, at 200.
288. Id. Arguably, advocates for the HIV-ill could prevent many of these negative results
by engaging in adequate planning and by providing adequate funding. Redmon suggests
possible solutions to the difficulties encountered by the mentally ill population that can be
applied prospectively to the HIV-ill situation. Id. at 201-03. For example, case management
programs might provide a beneficial treatment program for an HIV-ill individual. See id. at
202 (discussing case management programs for the indigents and homeless). For a more
thorough discussion of case management programs in the context of the HIV-ill, see infra
notes 333-39 and accompanying text. On the other hand, quarterway and halfway houses,
board-and-care homes, foster care, and crisis or temporary hostels are not satisfactory initial
goals because of their similarities to public shelters, where infectious diseases run rampant and
where an HIV-ill person has less of an opportunity to maintain health and privacy.
289. Comment, supra note 113, at 200-01 (citing Dr. Richard Lamb, the American
Psychiatric Association's Task Force chairman).
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reluctant to allocate funds for community-based services.2" Finally,
local governments thought that federal programs would finance com-
munity care, while the federal government thought that local govern-
ments would provide funding and services.29" '
Although many negative effects resulted from deinstitutionaliza-
tion-most notably, a rapid increase in homelessness-states acted to
refine their mental health laws to provide community-based treat-
ment. Many of these laws now authorize specialized housing for the
mentally ill population.292 For example, California's mental health
care system would likely authorize specialized housing because the
goal of its program is treatment in the community.29 a Even where
such an explicit statute does not exist, one commentator suggests that
courts interpret broadly state welfare laws to include a right to com-
munity mental health treatment.294 The strong potential for success
of this type of interpretation may be inferred from a line of New York
cases in which the New York Court of Appeals removed the justiciab-
lity obstacle for plaintiffs who are either dischargees or current
inmates of state mental health hospitals seeking residential place-
ments in the community.295 However, courts may limit their substan-
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Langdon & Kass, supra note 18, at 330. In fact, supporters of deinstitutionalization
"have turned to legal remedies to improve the process of transition to community care." Note,
supra note 21, at 1157.
293. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5450 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987) ("It is the intent of the
Legislature to establish a system of residential treatment programs in every county which
provide, in each county, a range of available services which will be alternatives to institutional
care and are based on principles of residential, community-based treatment.").
294. See Comment, supra note 113, at 208 (discussing California welfare laws).
295. The companion cases of Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475
N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984), and Joanne S. v. Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d
247 (1984), address the basic issue of whether persons treated for mental illness in New York
state institutions can assert claims on behalf of themselves for a declaration of their rights
against the state under the state's Mental Hygiene Law. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 532, 534,
463 N.E.2d at 591, 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250, 251. In Klostermann, the plaintiffs had been
treated in a state psychiatric hospital and discharged as part of the state's deinstitutionalization
policy of releasing patients to less restrictive, community-based residences. Id. at 531, 463
N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250. All of these plaintiffs, however, were relegated to the
streets. Id. In Joanne S., the main difference was the status of the plaintiffs who brought the
action. The plaintiffs were patients in a state psychiatric hospital who had been "found ready
to return to the community, but [had] not been discharged or released because of the lack of
adequate residential placements." Id. at 534, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
Both the Klostermann and the Joanne S. plaintiffs contended that they were "entitled to
appropriate residential placement, supervision, and care, including follow-ups," id. at 531, 463
N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250, upon their release from the state institution. In addition,
the Joanne S. plaintiffs requested "orders directing [the] defendants to release them into
community treatment settings and.., to develop and provide sufficient community treatment
settings to provide needed shelter and aftercare to the remainder of the plaintiff class." Id. at
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tive holdings to situations where the mentally ill person has been or is
presently under the state's care.2 96 If so, these mental health statutes
534, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251. The plaintiffs' main claim was based on the New
York Mental Hygiene Law, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15 (f)-(h), which, among other
things, required: (1) a written service plan to be prepared for each patient before his release,
setting forth the minimum requirements to be met by the patient upon discharge; (2) a
recommendation of the type of residence in which the patient should live; and (3) a listing of
services available to the patient in the community. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs relied on
arguments based on the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution, on various federal statutes, and on a common law duty to provide reasonable
care and protection from foreseeable harm to state hospital patients. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d
at 531-32, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
In both Klostermann and Joanne S., the New York Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiffs' claims were justiciable. Id. at 541, 463 N.E.2d at 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The
government in both cases presented a separation of powers argument. It argued that relief
could not be granted where a court is required to become involved in the decisionmaking
functions of other governmental branches and where resource-allocation is necessarily
involved. Id. at 535, 463 N.E.2d at 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252. The court rejected these
arguments, and concluded that the plaintiffs in both cases had "properly petitioned the courts
for a declaration of their rights." Id. at 540-41, 463 N.E.2d at 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
On remand, the Klostermann trial court, in ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint, favorably recognized the equal protection arguments that some patients were
refused residential placement, care, and supervision, while others-whose illnesses were less
severe-had received such placement, care, and supervision. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 126
Misc. 2d 247, 251, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. 1984). It is an equal protection violation
where "the more severely handicapped are allotted, for that reason, less assistance than to
others in the same class." Id. The trial court also declined to dismiss the claims grounded on
the state statutory requirement to furnish a proper written service plan for each patient.
Noting that the defendants essentially conceded their duty to provide such a plan and their
failure to comply with this duty, the court held that "the scope of the parties' entitlements...
should not be resolved summarily." Id. at 252, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
Klostermann serves to settle the justiciability issue in cases of a similar nature. Thus,
claims by the HIV-ill in search of medically-appropriate housing under a statute are
justiciable.
296. In Klostermann, the relevant statutory claims were treated partially unfavorably on
remand. Klostermann, 126 Misc. 2d at 254, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 586. The court emphasized that
the dischargees from psychiatric care were no longer in the care or custody of the state, and
certain claims were dismissed on those grounds. For example, the alleged right to receive
treatment under the fifth and fourteenth amendments was rejected because "[i]t is only
confinement of the patient that triggers a Federal constitutional obligation upon a state to
provide him with treatment." Id. at 250, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 584. Similarly, the court responded
to allegations grounded on state law by suggesting that "plaintiffs... not presently in the care
or custody of the State ... have no general claim to a particular type of care and treatment."
Id. at 251, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
In a more recent case, Love v. Koch, 554 N.Y.S.2d 595 (App. Div. 1990), the plaintiffs
were not limited to past or present recipients of treatment. They were "a class of seriously
mentally-ill persons ... in need of psychiatric care and treatment." Complaint at para. 1, Love
v. Koch, No. 4514/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INST., THE
RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 1988, at 483 (1988). The plaintiffs sought a declaration of their
rights and an injunction requiring the City of New York to cease refusing to provide
appropriate care and treatment. Id. In response to requests for treatment, the City regularly
claimed a lack of facilities as grounds for refusal, despite its "affirmative obligation to provide
adequate care and treatment." Id. at 484. The plaintiffs alleged that mentally-disabled
persons seeking assistance at municipal psychiatric hospitals were shackled or hand-cuffed to
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would still benefit a certain percentage of the HIV-ill population-
homeless HIV-ill people with mental disorders, such as AIDS demen-
tia,297 who have a history of treatment in state-run psychiatric facili-
ties-and may provide a basis for medically-appropriate housing.
The homeless HIV-ill with mental disorders appear to be the
only HIV-ill subgroup to benefit from direct application of the mental
health laws, and, even then, the extent of available remedies are lim-
ited because of vague statutory language that fails to mandate directly
community care services.2 9s However, advocates for the homeless
HIV-ill should look to existing laws and precedents that have been
applied to the homeless mentally ill and analogize them. The problem
with this approach is that with the existing attitudes toward the HIV-
ill in general, the analogy to mental health laws might add to the
stigma already associated with the disease.299 However, if the analogy
to mental health laws succeeds in the courts, the benefits in the form
of community care and medically-appropriate housing may outweigh
the societal costs.
wheelchairs while they awaited admission, and that in most cases, the hospitals failed to
provide services. Id. at 486.
Love attempts to extend the class of plaintiffs entitled to government care to those who
have not been in the custody of the government. Although this argument is rarely successful,
if the outcome of Love results in a justiciable claim, then the argument for a right to residential
treatment for the HIV-ill will be even stronger.
The plaintiffs sought an order declaring that the defendants had "mandatory obligations
to provide appropriate care and treatment to the mentally ill and mentally disabled people of
New York, and that . . . appropriate care and treatment for a homeless mentally-ill person
(who] is in need of treatment... must include in-patient hospitalization or residential care."
Love, No. 4514/88, slip op., reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INST., THE RIGHTS OF THE
HOMELESS 1988, at 505 (1988) (denying the defendants' motion to dismiss). The trial court
recognized that the general statutory scheme mandated that the government provide
appropriate services to the mentally ill in need of such services. Id. at 509. Further, it held
that the lack of resources was not a defense for failure to comply with the statutory mandate
and that plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the admissions
decisions were unlawfully premised on the availability of limited resources, or legally premised
on need-based medical determinations. Id. at 509-10. Finally, the court recognized that the
plaintiffs had failed to allege in the complaint that there was a right to residential placement as
to the homeless mentally ill persons. Id. at 510. Accordingly, the court reserved comment and
gave the plaintiffs leave to serve an amended complaint that specifically set forth the nature of
the relief sought. Id.
297. AIDS dementia is a neuropsychological disorder presumably caused by "direct
involvement of the brain by the neurotropic human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)."
Schofferman, Care of the Patient with AIDS, in AIDS PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND POLITICS
106 (I. Corless & M. Pittman-Lindeman eds. 1989). It involves a loss of intellectual capabilites
such as memory, concentration, and inpulse control. Id. Symptoms include anxiety,
sleeplessness, hallucinations, forgetfulness, and apathy. Id. at 107. Although the time course
of AIDS dementia varies with the individual, many patients suffer from a significant
deterioration in mental status over a period of months. Id. at 106.
298. Note, supra note 21, at 1158.
299. See supra note 73.
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Mental health laws, which typically are the most well-developed
areas of health-related law, are therefore useful as a basis for compari-
son to statutory reform in the AIDS context. Legislators working to
provide housing for the homeless HIV-ill can rectify the vagueness
and incompleteness of mental health laws by creating new laws that
are specifically defined to apply to the homeless HIV-ill and that
clearly require residential placements in the community. If legislators
act quickly to plan for community health care and adequate housing
for the homeless HIV-ill, perhaps it is not too late to prevent a catas-
trophe such as was caused by deinstitutionalization. Because many of
the treatment needs of the mentally ill and the HIV-ill are the
same,300 the existing services should be readily adaptable to the home-
less HIV-ill. Advocates agree that AIDS legislation is desperately
needed in the form of direct mandates in clear, precise statutes using a
broad-based approach.3 °1 It is through this type of reform and appro-
priate funding that states will begin to realize their duty to provide
medically-appropriate housing to the homeless HIV-ill.
4. MENTAL HEALTH LAWS: ARGUMENTS FROM
THE COMMON LAW
Mental health statutory and constitutional provisions are much
more developed than corresponding AIDS legislation. Some com-
mentators opine, however, that the best recourse for lack of explicit
legislative support is to turn to common law arguments, especially in
the areas of patient release and transition from inpatient care to com-
munity care.3 °2 State constitutions and statutes may remain limited in
their ability to address the inadequacies in community care that cur-
rently confront a large number of the homeless mentally ill.303 Simi-
larly, the homeless HIV-ill are not explicitly protected by any current
statutes. Until legislators act, a powerful mode of attack is the com-
mon law principles employing medical assistance as the basis for a
future right to appropriate residential accommodation.
The common law theory of negligent patient release "recognizes
a continuing duty of care that extends beyond the termination of a
patient's institutional stay and accompanies the patient's return to the
community." 3" A health care provider breaches this duty of care
300. For example, there is a similarity in their abilities to maintain particular lifestyles
without needing confinement or constant supervision, while at the same time requiring a
stable, clean place to live.
301. See McKittrick, supra note 31, at 423.
302. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 1157-67.
303. Id. at 1157.
304. Id. at 1161.
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when he exposes a patient to reasonably foreseeable harm.30 5  A
health care provider must consider the circumstances of a patient's
release, "along with their potential prospective effect on the [patient]
being released. ' a0 6 This theory is applicable to the subgroup of the
homeless HIV-ill who have been in the custody of the state (even in its
capacity as a health care provider) and are ready to be released.
Arguably, this theory is applicable not only to involuntarily confined
patients, but also to patients in public health hospitals who are in the
state's custody. 30 7
Another common law theory that may be applicable to the
homeless HIV-ill is the tort of abandonment. Courts have applied
principles of abandonment 30 8 in the context of mental health medical
malpractice to the circumstances of release of a patient under the poli-
cies of deinstitutionalization. 31 In a parallel analysis, the same theo-
ries are applicable to the release of the HIV-ill into the community
after various stages of treatment. This parallel may apply only if
some form of involuntary confinement has occurred. 310 Even though
there may not be constitutional or statutory provisions that mandate
an original affirmative obligation to provide minimally adequate dis-
charge planning, once a relationship between a state and patient is
commenced, the state is bound "to proceed with due care."' 311 "IT]he
common law can be [a] most effective [tool] in recognizing violations
305. See id. at 1161 & nn.44-46. "'It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at
all.'" Id. at 1161 n.44 (quoting Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276
(1922)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 comment g (1965) ("Good
Samaritan" doctrine).
306. Note, supra note 21, at 1162 (citing Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362
N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1977)).
307. This subgroup includes a substantial amount of people if "custody" is expansively
defined. At least some type of confinement or detention is required to constitute custody.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 347 (5th ed. 1979).
308. Note, supra note 21, at 1162 n.52, 1164 n.57 (discussing Le Jeune Road Hospital Inc.
v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); and Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn.
144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970)); see also Banks, supra note 3, at 159.
309. See Note, supra note 21, at 1162. It is interesting to note that this type of common law
claim on behalf of the homeless mentally ill was already argued by the plaintiffs in
Klostermann. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1984). The Klostermann trial court rejected the argument, citing two cases that suggested
that similar claims had been rejected in the past. Klostermann, 126 Misc. 2d at 253, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 585. One commentator argues that these cases were inapposite. Note, supra note
21, at 1166 n.65. The Klostermann court further stated that even if such a common law claim
were recognized, thereby creating the possibility of future claims, its denial of jurisdiction
precluded discussion of the claim. Klostermann, 126 Misc. 2d at 253, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
310. Although confinement is not advocated, if it does come to pass, arguments under the
tort of abandonment is a suggested approach.
311. Note, supra note 21, at 1163.
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of due care, '  especially in the clearest cases of negligence. Such
cases include circumstances in which hospitals make no reasonable
attempt to locate necessary community after-care services prior to a
patient's discharge, but rather release the patient to the streets.3" 3
B. The Scope of Health Care Services
The right to health care laws call for the government to provide a
reasonable scope of services to eligible recipients.31 4 Courts have
expansively interpreted these provisions under the existing indigent
health care programs.315 Although housing traditionally has not been
included as a part of the services or treatment that agencies must pro-
vide,316 many states provide shelter in the form of hospitalization to
those in need of emergency care. 1 7 Homeless individuals in an acute
stage of HIV-illness, therefore, can obtain temporary shelter in con-
junction with emergency hospital treatment a.3 8 Following the emer-
gency hospitalization, however, HIV-ill individuals often recover
temporarily, thereby requiring less-intensive care.31 9
Advocates for the homeless HIV-ill seeking state aid can employ
an argument stemming from a provision of the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973.320 The Act lists basic services allegedly
necessary to maintain the health of an average individual, including
physician services, inpatient and outpatient hospital services, emer-
gency medical care, limited outpatient mental health services, alcohol
and drug abuse treatment and referrals, laboratory and x-ray services,
312. Id. at 1164.
313. Id..at 1164 & n.61.
314. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 11.
315. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 234, at 734. For example, "[s]everal courts
have required the provision of dental care to the medically indigent." Id. (citing California
state cases).
316. See supra note 235.
317. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care,
26 Hous. L. REV. 21, 53-54 (1989) ("Almost half of the states have legislation requiring
hospitals to provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay .... "). The Hospital Survey
and Construction Act, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 24, 31, 33, 42, 46, 48 & 49 U.S.C.), establishes community service obligations for hospitals,
including uncompensated emergency medical care services to every individual within a
hospital's area, regardless of the recipient's ability to pay. Id. In exchange, the federal
government provides funds to build and modernize public and private nonprofit health care
facilities. Rothenberg, supra, at 57-59; see also Perkins & Boyle, AIDS and Poverty: Dual
Barriers to Health Care, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1283, 1286 (1986).
318. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
319. Perkins & Boyle, supra note 317, at 1284.
320. Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 2, 87 Stat. 914 (current version at scattered sections of 12 & 42
U.S.C.).
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and preventative health services.32" ' The totality of these services,
therefore, arguably constitutes the minimum acceptable level of care
that meets federal statutory or constitutional mandates to maintain
the health of the indigent.322 The inclusion of home health services in
the Act's list 323 poses special issues for the treatment of the homeless
HIV-ill. Apparently, the Act, and probably most health care laws,
was not drafted with the homeless population in mind. To accommo-
date today's realities, therefore, either legislatures should draft new
statutes or courts should interpret present legislation with the needs
of the homeless population in mind.
VI. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Advocates in and out of the courtroom increasingly employ eco-
nomically-based arguments. Litigators sometimes rely on the science
of economics in an attempt to sway the courts in matters of public
policy. Similarly, legislators often respond with enthusiasm to argu-
ments that appear to bring about savings for their constituents.324
Thus, the legislative route to the provision of medically-appropriate
housing for the homeless HIV-ill may depend not on legal theory, but
on economic realities.325
Interestingly, the most compassionate and appropriate care-giv-
ing alternatives to hospital care tend to be more cost-effective than
321. Id.
322. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 14.
323. Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 2, 87 Stat. 914 (current version at scattered sections of 12 & 42
U.S.C.).
324. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Jim McDermott (Washington) to his colleagues
(Oct. 18, 1989) (requesting support for H.R. 3423, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.
6746 (1989)).
325. In cases of specified care for targeted subpopulations such as the "homeless,
intravenous drug users with AIDS," Benjamin, supra note 45, at 428, alternatives to hospital
care are more likely to be successful as a cost containment measure. "[B]roader (i.e. less
targeted) approaches[, however,] are unlikely to reduce utilization [of hospitals] or costs." Id.
(citations omitted). Moreover, implied support for AIDS-specific legislation can be found in
"the Medicaid waiver program for Home and Community Based Services." Makadon, supra
note 230, at 126. This waiver allows states to provide services using federal funds especially
for AIDS patients, but not for other Medicaid beneficiaries. Id. The state must show that the
offered services "will be cost effective, community based, and prevent institutionalization." Id.
The administratively burdensome tasks of filing for a waiver and documenting the continued
effectiveness of the program have hampered states' widespread adoption of these programs.
Id. Many states, moreover, apparently feel that their programs are already effective enough to
meet the needs of their residents. Id. Those individuals ineligible for Medicaid under the strict
eligibility requirements will not benefit from this program at all. Id.
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hospital care326 when they are well-established in a community.327
Although the existence of savings provided by these alternative pro-
grams is the subject of some controversy,328 most commentators agree
that the cost of hospitalization greatly exceeds home health, hospice,
and community-based care.329  In community-wide public discus-
sions, participants propose the development of outpatient and com-
munity care services as a cost-reduction method designed to limit the
utilization of inpatient hospital care for the homeless HIV-ill.
330
Moreover, these alternative forms of care frequently serve the needs
of the homeless HIV-ill better than unnecessary and excessive inpa-
tient care.331 Hospitals in New Jersey, for example, have estimated
326. Lambert, supra note 57, at E6, col. 1. The personal medical care costs of the HIV-ill
include hospital, physician, nursing home, home health care, counseling, and drug costs. In
sum, "[tihe economic, personal, and social costs [of HIV-illness] are staggering and
recommendations to ease these problems are being made and debated." Drapkin, supra note
44, at 92 (citations omitted). The use of hospitals as residences is very uneconomic.
Cheuvront, supra note 17, at 14 (citing Barbara Van Buren, former director of the AIDS
Services Delivery Consortium, a coalition of agencies that work with the HIV-ill). Regarding
costs generally, one activist sarcastically claims "that he can place nonacute AIDS patients in
first-class hotel rooms and throw in around-the-clock nursing care for the same price that...
[New York City] pays to keep these patients hospitalized." Traska, supra note 261, at 69
(quoting an unidentified speaker).
327. The success of community care is predicated on the assumptions that: (1) the "home-
and community-based service alternatives that will substitute for hospital care are, in fact,
available," Benjamin, supra note 45, at 428 (emphasis added); and (2) "the length of hospital
stays is primarily determined by the availability of service alternatives." Id.
328. See, e.g., Crowley, The Hospice Movement: A Renewed View of the Death Process, 4 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 295, 309 (1988) (discussing the cost-ineffectiveness of the
hospice alternative for cancer patients); see also Benjamin, supra note 45, at 428-29. Drawing
on the experience gained from the provision of long-term care for the elderly, Benjamin argues
that complex issues must be addressed before implementing a new system of delivery of
nonhospital health care services for the HIV-ill. For example, the initial costs of establishing
community services in cities which have none must be taken into account. Benjamin concedes,
however, that the differences between the HIV-ill and the elderly provide grounds for
optimism in implementing community care for the HIV-ill. Id. at 426-27.
Actual cost savings estimates vary. For example, one commentator compares the average
daily hospital cost for an HIV-ill individual-$681-to the cost of a home health nursing
visit-S70 to $75-and concludes that the "difference is significant." Carney, AIDS Care
Comes Home: Balancing Benefits and Difficulties, 8 HOME HEALTHCARE NURSE 32, 36
(1990). Other sources are consistent in their reports of costs for the HIV-ill; for example,
hospitalization is reported to cost between $600 and $900 per day. Benjamin, supra note 45, at
427. This simple comparison, however, does not take into account the likelihood that patients
will utilize institutional services as a supplement to community and home health services. Id.
(based on experiences with the elderly population). Nonetheless, because the divergence
between the two figures is so great, some savings will ostensibly result from reduced inpatient
stays.
329. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 234, at 732 & n.64; see also H.R. 3423, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 6746 (1989); Cheuvront, supra note 17, at 15; Lambert,
supra note 57, at E6, col. 1.
330. Benjamin, supra note 45, at 426.
331. Traska, supra note 261, at 69.
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that twenty-five percent of their patients with AIDS could be dis-
charged to a lower level of care and still have their needs satisfactorily
met.
332
Another cost-savings approach that has recently attracted the
attention of the medical community is the case management method.
Case management, a relatively new approach for providing health
care,33 describes a variety of coordinating activities that health prov-
iders undertake on behalf of patients.334 These activities range from
purely social services, to a combination of medical and social serv-
ices.335 Although case management appears to be an extremely effec-
tive cost-containment tool, private insurers who offer case
management programs report varying results.336 In fact, case man-
agement alone is not a panacea. Problems include financing,337 volun-
teer buM-out,338 and discrimination by nursing homes against the
HIV-ill.3 39 Thus, advocates for the homeless HIV-ill should thor-
oughly investigate the available options and cost-savings in their com-
munities before approaching legislators for one cost-savings approach
over another.
VII. CONCLUSION
State and federal legislative reform is desperately needed to
address the needs of America's homeless population--especially those
with HIV-illness. Although use of existing laws may lead to inconsis-
332. Perkins & Boyle, Health Benefits: How the System Is Responding to AIDS, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 724, 732 (1988) (citing Laudicina, Financing for AIDS Care, 11 J.
AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 55 (1988)).
333. Silverstein, Halpern, Dean & Palmer, Confronting the Medical-Legal Issues of AIDS,
10 WHITTIER L. REV. 401, 436 (1988) [hereinafter Silverstein].
334. Makadon, supra note 230, at 127.
335. Id. Makadon describes case management, as utilized by insurance companies, to be a
system where a case manager analyzes the clinical needs of each patient at "high risk for
catastrophic health care costs ... to determine whether high-quality care could be provided to
this patient at a lower cost," id., by making use of a range of services rather than the standard
benefits package. Id.
336. Silverstein, supra note 333, at 436. Blue Shield of California, for example, "states that
it has saved $8,000 per AIDS patient in the past eighteen months." Id. Moreover, John
Hancock of Boston claims savings of approximately $56,000 per AIDS patient. Id.
337. "[Flew home care services are available to AIDS patients in general." Traska, supra
note 261, at 70 (noting the observations of Charles Flood, director of the hospice crisis care
service at the Albert Einstein Medical Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). Even worse,
under Virginia law, home health aides may "refuse to care for Medicaid patients with
contagious diseases," id. (noting the observations of Caitlin Ryan, a Washington D.C.-area
consultant), including AIDS, even though it is infectious not contagious. Id.
338. Silverstein, supra note 333, at 437 (discussing the experience of San Francisco
volunteers, some of whom were HIV-ill themselves).
339. Traska, supra note 261, at 70.
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tent results, advocates for the homeless HIV-ill should search their
state statutes for legislation that provides a basis for shelter or a basis
for health care. Further, state mental health laws may provide an
avenue for temporary medically-appropriate housing for certain seg-
ments of the homeless population-those with AIDS dementia. The
existing mental health laws may also be useful as a basis for compari-
son in developong HIV-specific legislation. Until new legislation is
forthcoming, advocates should urge courts for the broadest interpre-
tation possible of existing laws in an attempt to stem the growing tide
of the homeless HIV-ill. The courts and legislatures alike must
respond to this emerging crisis before it burgeons uncontrollably,
much like the deinstitutionalization program of the 1970's.
Many citizens have expressed the sentiment of helping those less
fortunate than themselves. Their reluctance to reach into their pock-
ets, however, is strong; thus, courts and legislatures must continue to
seek new solutions. Legislators should pursue humanistic and eco-
nomically-based arguments to provide community health care to the
homeless HIV-ill at the most cost-effective level possible. Creative
utilization of non-hospital based, less expensive alternatives should
help legislators garner popular support for statutory assistance to the
HIV-ill.
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